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ABSTRACT
CASE STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEERING DESIGN MODIFICATION
PROJECTS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A KNOWLEDGE RETENTION TOOL
IN SUPPORT OF THE LONGEVITY AND RESILIENCE OF THE NUCLEAR POWER
INDUSTRY
Pamela M. Torres-Jiménez
Old Dominion University, 2018
Director: Dr. Adrian V. Gheorghe

The nuclear power industry in the United States (U.S.) has gone through various changes
throughout its history. Most recently, plans to grow the industry through the construction of new
power plants have ceased. Because of this, the industry is at a period where the longevity and
resilience of existing nuclear power plants are vital to its subsistence.
One of the ways existing nuclear power plants can assure longevity and resilience is by
performing engineering design modifications efficiently and at a lower cost. Strategic plans, such
as the Delivering the Nuclear Promise, can support nuclear utilities to achieve this. Another
strategy to accomplish longevity and resilience is to ensure individuals performing these projects
possess the proper knowledge to complete tasks efficiently while being cost-effective.
Knowledge retention is the main purpose of this research project.
This doctoral dissertation develops a case study for engineering design modification
projects at nuclear power plants, with the intention of it becoming a knowledge retention tool to
support the longevity and resilience of the industry. A literature review of subjects such as an
overview of nuclear power plants, license renewal, resilience, and knowledge management
comprises the first part of this paper. The literature review is followed by the description of the
research methodology and the results of the research. Three parts comprise the results section.
Part one develops a work breakdown structure (WBS) for a design modification project. Part two

provides a list of activity descriptions that need to be completed as part of a conceptual design
package, including estimated person-hours and proposed durations for each activity. The third
part performs a risk assessment using the Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) tool. This section
identifies potential failure modes for each activity, causes of failure, human performance tools
that can help prevent or detect the failures, and recommends actions to address and mitigate the
risks identified. The results of this case study demonstrate how, with the correct knowledge,
engineering design modification risks can be mitigated and activities can be accounted for when
developing project estimates. This information can assist the future development of efficient and
cost-effective projects within the nuclear industry.

iv

Copyright, 2018, by Pamela M. Torres-Jiménez, All Rights Reserved.

v

This doctoral dissertation is dedicated to a special person who, without knowing it, has given me
utmost inspiration to work hard every single day and become a better version of myself; to my
daughter, Alexa M. Graham. Even though you are still young, I hope that in the future you can
see this project as an example of hard work and sacrifice. Hopefully, it will become your
inspiration to work hard for what you want and to never give up on your dreams. Success will
not come easy, but rest assured that I will be next to you every step of the way to guide and
support you. That is the greatest gift I could ever give to you.

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank my mother, Iris P. Jiménez Guadalupe, for being the
prime example of hard work and sacrifice, and always being there for me and my brother
Michael L. Navedo Jiménez. Without her help and encouragement, I would have never made it
as far as I am today. To my daughter, Alexa M. Graham, my fiancé, Rodney D. Graham, and my
grandmother, Iris Guadalupe Concepción, thank you for your undeniable support throughout this
journey.
I will also like to extend many thanks to my advisor, Dr. Adrian Gheorghe, for believing
in me and helping me through this research. Thanks also go to my committee for dedicating their
time and guidance through this effort. To my colleagues, thank you for your support and for
providing a helping hand when needed.

vii

NOMENCLATURE
ACI

American Concrete Institute

AD

Applicability Determination

AE

Architectural Engineering

AMP

Aging Management Program

AMR

Aging Management Review

AOV

Air Operated Valve

ASME

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

AWS

American Welding Society

BWR

Boiling Water Reactor

CAD

Computer Aided Design

CCA

Cause and Consequences Analysis

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CLB

Current Licensing Basis

DAR

Design Attribute Review

EDF

Électricité de France

EQ

Environmental Qualification

FLEX

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies

FMEA

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis

FSAR

Final Safety Analysis Report

FTA

Fault Tree Analysis

FWT

Filtered Water Tank

viii
GALL

Generic Aging Lessons Learned

HAZOP

Hazard and Operability Analysis

HRA

Human Reliability Analysis

HU

Human Performance

I&C

Instrumentation and Controls

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

INPO

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

IPA

Integrated Plant Assessment

JSA

Job Safety Analysis

KPI

Key Performance Indicator

LER

License Event Reports

MOV

Motor Operated Valve

MUPRA

Multi-Unit Probabilistic Risk Assessment

NEI

Nuclear Energy Institute

NFPA

National Fire Protection Association

NNS

Non-Nuclear Safety Related

NPP

Nuclear Power Plant

ODU

Old Dominion University

OE

Operating Experience

P&ID

Process and Instrumentation Drawing

PDF

Portable Document Format

PHA

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

ix
PI

Performance Improvement

PRA

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PWR

Pressurized Water Reactor

RPN

Risk Priority Number

SAR

Safety Analysis Report

SDP

Standard Design Process

SDPSC

Standard Design Process Steering Committee

SFP

Spent Fuel Pool

SME

Subject Matter Expert

SSC

System, Structure, or Component

TMI

Three Mile Island

TVO

Teollisuunden Voina

U.S.

United States

U.S. NRC or NRC

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

WBS

Work Breakdown Structure

x
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES .........................................................................................................................xv
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................... xviii
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................1
1.1. Problem Background ........................................................................................................... 2
1.2. Research Problem Statement ............................................................................................... 2
1.3. Purpose................................................................................................................................. 3
1.4. Research Framework ........................................................................................................... 4
1.5. Research Questions .............................................................................................................. 6
1.6. Data Collection .................................................................................................................... 6
1.7. Expected Results and Criteria for Evaluating Results ......................................................... 7
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................8
2.1. Nuclear Power Plants Overview .......................................................................................... 9
2.2. Accidents within the Nuclear Power Industry ................................................................... 10
2.3. Governance of Large Multi-Firm Projects ......................................................................... 16
2.4. Project Cost and Schedule ................................................................................................. 18
2.5. Representations of Nuclear Risk ........................................................................................ 20
2.6. Strategic Fit ........................................................................................................................ 20
2.7. Resilience and Economic Effects....................................................................................... 21
2.8. Resilience and Human Performance .................................................................................. 24
2.8.1. Overall Situational Awareness .....................................................................................26

xi
Chapter

Page

2.8.2. Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities....................................................................26
2.8.3. Adaptive Capacity ........................................................................................................26
2.9. Resilience and Human Reliability Analysis ...................................................................... 27
2.10. Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Risk .............................................................................. 28
2.11. Nuclear Knowledge Management.................................................................................... 30
2.12. Delivering the Nuclear Promise and the Standard Design Process ................................. 31
2.13. Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal ............................................................................ 33
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...............................................................................................38
3.1. Methodological design and rationale for the design .......................................................... 38
3.2. Proposed Analysis .............................................................................................................. 40
3.3. Research Design and Methods ........................................................................................... 40
3.4. Subject Matter Expert Reviews ......................................................................................... 41
4. RESULTS ..................................................................................................................................43
4.1. Part I: Work Breakdown Structure .................................................................................... 43
4.2. Part II: Activity Definitions and Estimates ........................................................................ 57
4.2.1. Pre-Job Brief ................................................................................................................62
4.2.2. Procedure Use and Adherence .....................................................................................63
4.2.3. Project Definition and Pre-Design Walkdown.............................................................64
4.2.4. Design Inputs ...............................................................................................................67
4.2.5. Identify New and/or Update Affected Design Documents ..........................................69
4.2.6. Drawings ......................................................................................................................70
4.2.7. Calculations..................................................................................................................73

xii
Chapter

Page

4.2.8. Technical Reports ........................................................................................................74
4.2.9. Specifications ...............................................................................................................75
4.2.10. Plant Operating Procedures ........................................................................................75
4.2.11. Training Materials ......................................................................................................76
4.2.12. Design Basis Documents ...........................................................................................77
4.2.13. Installation Instructions ..............................................................................................78
4.2.14. 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Review ......................................................................................79
4.2.15. Programs Impact Review ...........................................................................................82
4.2.16. Design Reviews .........................................................................................................83
4.2.17. Estimates for Next Phases ..........................................................................................84
4.2.18. Conceptual Impact Review Meeting ..........................................................................85
4.2.19. Conceptual Design Estimate ......................................................................................86
4.2.20. Conceptual Design Schedule .....................................................................................88
4.3. Part III: Risks ..................................................................................................................... 91
4.3.1. FMEA Severity Scale ..................................................................................................94
4.3.2. FMEA Likelihood of Failure Scale..............................................................................96
4.3.3. FMEA Opportunity for Detection Scale ......................................................................98
4.3.4. Resources ...................................................................................................................100
4.3.5. FMEA for Define Project...........................................................................................101
4.3.6. FMEA for Walkdowns ...............................................................................................104
4.3.7. FMEA for Design Inputs ...........................................................................................107
4.3.8. FMEA for New Drawings ..........................................................................................109

xiii
Chapter

Page

4.3.9. FMEA for Impacted Drawings ..................................................................................112
4.3.10. FMEA for Drawing Peer Review.............................................................................115
4.3.11. FMEA for Calculations ............................................................................................118
4.3.12. FMEA for Calculation Peer Review ........................................................................121
4.3.13. FMEA for Identification of Impacted Procedures ...................................................124
4.3.14. FMEA for Design Basis Documents........................................................................126
4.3.15. FMEA for Bill of Materials .....................................................................................128
4.3.16. FMEA for 50.59/72.48 Review ...............................................................................131
4.3.17. FMEA for SAR Update ...........................................................................................134
4.3.18. FMEA for Programs Impact Review .......................................................................136
4.3.19. FMEA for SME Internal Review .............................................................................139
4.3.20. FMEA for Next Phase Estimate ...............................................................................141
4.3.21. FMEA Conceptual Design Meeting.........................................................................144
4.3.23. Risk Priority Number ...............................................................................................144
5. CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................................146
5.1. Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................ 146
5.2. Limitations and Future Research ..................................................................................... 149
5.3. Contribution to the Engineering Management Field of Knowledge ................................ 150
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................152
APPENDIX A ..............................................................................................................................157
APPENDIX B ..............................................................................................................................162
APPENDIX C ..............................................................................................................................168

xiv
Page
APPENDIX D ..............................................................................................................................175
VITA ............................................................................................................................................178

xv
LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1. Subject Matter Expert Review Form ........................................................................................ 42
2. Estimate for Project Definition and Walkdowns ...................................................................... 67
3. Estimate for Design Inputs........................................................................................................ 69
4. Estimate for Drawings and Peer Reviews ................................................................................. 72
5. Estimate for Calculations .......................................................................................................... 74
6. Estimate for Procedures ............................................................................................................ 76
7. Estimate for Design Basis Documents ...................................................................................... 77
8. Estimate for Bill of Materials ................................................................................................... 79
9. Estimate for 50.59/72.48 Review.............................................................................................. 81
10. Estimate for Programs Impact Review ................................................................................... 83
11. Estimate for SME Internal Review ......................................................................................... 84
12. Estimate for Next Design Phase ............................................................................................. 85
13. Estimate for Conceptual Design Meeting ............................................................................... 86
14. Complete Estimate for Conceptual Design Phase .................................................................. 87
15. FMEA Severity Scale ............................................................................................................. 95
16. FMEA Likelihood of Failure Scale......................................................................................... 97
17. FMEA Opportunity for Detection Scale ................................................................................. 99
18. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Define Project ........................... 102
19. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Define Project ............................................................... 102
20. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Walkdowns ............................... 105
21. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Walkdowns.................................................................... 105

xvi
Table

Page

22. Failure Modes, Effects, and Causes, and Recommendations – Design Inputs ..................... 107
23. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Inputs ................................................................ 108
24. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – New Drawings .......................... 110
25. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Inputs ................................................................ 110
26. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Impacted Drawings ................... 113
27. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Impacted Drawings ....................................................... 113
28. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations –Drawings Peer Review .............. 116
29. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Drawings Peer Review .................................................. 116
30. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Calculations .............................. 119
31. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculations ................................................................... 120
32. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Calculation Peer Review .......... 122
33. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculation Peer Review ............................................... 122
34. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Identification of Impacted
Procedures ................................................................................................................................... 124
35. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Identification of Impacted Procedures .......................... 125
36. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Design Basis Documents .......... 126
37. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Basis Documents .............................................. 127
38. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Bill of Materials ........................ 129
39. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Bill of Materials ............................................................ 130
40. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – 50.59/72.48 Review .................. 132
41. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – 50.59/72.48 Review ...................................................... 132
42. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – SAR Update .............................. 134

xvii
Table

Page

43. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – SAR Update .................................................................. 135
44. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Programs Impact Review ......... 137
45. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Programs Impact Review .............................................. 137
46. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – SME Internal Review ............... 139
47. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – SME Internal Review .................................................... 140
48. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Next Phase Estimate/Schedule . 142
49. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Next Phase Estimate/Schedule ...................................... 143
50. List of Power Reactors in the U.S. and Application Status (NRC, 2018) ............................ 157
51. Summary of Reactors in the U.S........................................................................................... 161
52. Summary of License Renewal Application Status for Reactors in the U.S. ......................... 161
53. Part I SME #1 Comments and Resolutions........................................................................... 162
54. Part I SME #2 Comments and Resolutions........................................................................... 166
55. Part I SME #3 Comments and Resolutions........................................................................... 167
56. Part II SME #1 Comments and Resolutions ......................................................................... 168
57. Part II SME #2 Comments and Resolutions ......................................................................... 172
58. Part II SME #3 Comments and Resolutions ......................................................................... 174
59. Part III SME #1 Comments and Resolutions ........................................................................ 175
60. Part III SME #2 Comments and Resolutions ........................................................................ 176
61. Part III SME #3 Comments and Resolutions ........................................................................ 177

xviii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1. Research Framework .................................................................................................................. 5
2. Location of U.S. Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (NRC, 2017) ...................... 9
3. Three Mile Island Plant Layout (NRC, 2014) .......................................................................... 11
4. Chernobyl RBMK 1000 Plant Layout (NEA and OECD; 2002).............................................. 12
5. Fukushima Daiichi Accident (FEPC, 2018) ............................................................................. 13
6. The supply network of the Olkiluoto 3 project (Ruuska et al., 2011) ...................................... 17
7. The supply network of the Flamanville 3 project (Ruuska et al., 2011) ................................... 17
8. Relationship between vulnerability and adaptive capacity of a system in relation to a
disaster event (Dalziell and McManus, 2004) .............................................................................. 22
9. Relationship between organizational resilience and recovery (Dalziell and McManus,
2004) ............................................................................................................................................. 23
10. Impact on KPIs as a measure of system resilience (Dalziell and McManus, 2004) ............... 24
11. INPO’s Performance Improvement Model (INPO, 2006) ...................................................... 25
12. Example of Multi-Unit Risk ................................................................................................... 30
13. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Overall ..................................................................... 51
14. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Identify New and/or Update Affected Design
Documents .................................................................................................................................... 52
15. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Installation Instructions ........................................... 53
16. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Review ................................... 54
17. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Programs Impact ...................................................... 55
18. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Project Activities ..................................................... 56

xix
Figure

Page

19. Standard Design Process Flowchart (SDPRC, 2017) ............................................................. 58
20. Conceptual/Common Design Phase Flowchart (SDPRC, 2017) ............................................ 60
21. Conceptual Design Schedule – Task, Duration, Resources, and Budget Hours (Microsoft
Project) .......................................................................................................................................... 89
22. Conceptual Design Schedule – Timeline (Microsoft Project) ................................................ 90
23. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Define Project ............................................................... 103
24. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Walkdowns.................................................................... 106
25. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Inputs ................................................................ 108
26. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – New Drawings............................................................... 111
27. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Impacted Drawings ....................................................... 114
28. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Drawings Peer Review .................................................. 117
29. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculations ................................................................... 120
30. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculation Peer Review ............................................... 123
31. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Identification of Impacted Procedures .......................... 125
32. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Basis Documents .............................................. 127
33. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Bill of Materials ............................................................ 130
34. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – 50.59/72.48 Review ...................................................... 133
35. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – SAR Update .................................................................. 135
36. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Programs Impact Review .............................................. 138
37. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – SME Internal Review .................................................... 140
38. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Next Phase Estimate/Schedule ...................................... 143
39. Failure Modes Severity, Occurrence, Detection Ranks, and Risk Priority Number............. 145

1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Much like any other industry in the world, the nuclear power industry in the United States
(U.S.) deals with issues such as figuring out how to keep relevant knowledge within the industry
and how to modify practices to increase overall success. Due to recent plant closures and matters
related to ongoing new nuclear power plant builds, the industry is in need of improving processes
with the purpose of completing projects in a shorter time and for a lower cost. This especially
holds true for engineering design projects. The efficient and cost-effective development of
engineering design modifications could safeguard the resilience and future of the industry.
Instead of building new nuclear power plants, the U.S. nuclear power industry should rely
on alternative subsistence strategies. One of these strategies is the successful and cost-effective
development and implementation of engineering design modifications to keep plants operating
safely and reliably. If utilities can perform these projects in less time and for lower costs, they
could become proactive in the enhancement of systems, structures, and components (SSCs). This
strategy can, therefore, increase the longevity of nuclear power plants.
With the subsistence of the nuclear power industry in mind, this case study researches the
history of nuclear power plants in the U.S., among other topics. Subjects such as governance of
large multi-firm projects, project cost and schedule, risk, knowledge retention issues and
strategies, initiatives within the industry, and the license renewal process, among others, are
discussed.
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1.1. Problem Background
The U.S. nuclear power industry may require large-scale design modifications that call
for a combination of engineering and project management knowledge and experience to be
successful. Project management consists of a comprehensive plan involving a well-defined work
breakdown structure (WBS), clear timelines, available resources, and a broad understanding of
potential risks. At the same time, technical knowledge in the engineering field is essential. Due
to the uniqueness of nuclear power technology, vast regulation, and the continuous effort to
maintain safety as paramount, engineering design projects can also be considered unique. The
uniqueness of engineering projects within this industry makes the documentation of knowledge
an essential step towards subsistence.

1.2. Research Problem Statement
The development of an engineering design modification involves various elements such
as experienced resources with knowledge of the problem and a comprehensive project plan. In
situations like the 2011 Fukushima response, where the entire U.S. industry set goals to improve
plants in specific time periods, it is likely that projects need to be developed in short periods of
time and sometimes using less-experienced resources. As a result, and since at times the
procedures to follow do not present a straightforward approach on how to accomplish individual
activities, a clearly-defined example of an engineering design project is needed. In other words,
the industry is in need of a guide on engineering modifications that can be used by experienced
resources and entry-level resources alike.
This paper focuses on the development of a case study for an engineering design
modification for a nuclear power plant that can be used as an example for developing other

3
engineering projects. The study will focus on, not only explaining what activities need to be
completed but how to accomplish them successfully.
The results of this research will provide the nuclear industry with an innovative and
reliable tool to be used to develop engineering design modifications in the future. The case study
can later be used as an example to build case studies aimed at other industries. This new tool will
not only benefit the nuclear industry but will also help others trying to develop a successful
engineering design project.

1.3. Purpose
The primary purpose of this paper is to capture the knowledge related to the development
of engineering design modification projects for nuclear power plants as a knowledge retention
tool for the U.S. nuclear power industry and is achieved by:
1. Developing a comprehensive work breakdown structure for an engineering design
project,
2. Providing descriptions of each activity, resources needed, and activity durations,
and
3. Identifying potential risks involved with each activity and providing a means to
eliminate or mitigate those risks.
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1.4. Research Framework
This research project intends to build a case study for the project design phase of
engineering design modifications. The resulting case study will serve as a guide for the
development of successful engineering projects for nuclear power plants. The concepts described
previously are shown graphically in Figure 1.
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Engineering Design
Modification Project for
Nuclear Power Plant

What activities need to occur
during the life of the project?

Feedback
Develop Work
Breakdown Structure
(4.1)

Subject Matter Expert
Review
(Appendix B)

What does each activity mean?
How long will they take to
complete? Who should
complete them?
Feedback
Develop Activity Descriptions,
Estimates and Schedule
(4.2)

Subject Matter Expert
Review
(Appendix C)

What risks are associated with each
activity? What can be done to mitigate
those risks?

Feedback
Subject Matter Expert
Review
(Appendix D)

Identify and Evaluate
Risks
(4.3)

Conclusions and
Recommendations
(5)

Figure 1. Research Framework
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1.5. Research Questions
Once the purpose of the project is addressed, the following research questions will be
answered:
1. How is a comprehensive work breakdown structure for an engineering design
project within the nuclear industry structured?
2. What processes should take place to deliver a successful project?
3. What risk(s) could be present? What is the recommended risk response? How can
these risks impact the overall success of the project?
The resulting case study will be a guideline that can be used to plan successful
engineering design projects for nuclear power plants, specifically from the architectural
engineering (AE) company’s standpoint, rather than from a utility standpoint. Ultimately, the use
of the case study can decrease the learning curve needed to complete an engineering design
project successfully, and consequently, reduce utilities' operating costs. This case study will,
therefore, contribute to the Delivering the Nuclear Promise strategic plan (NEI, 2016).

1.6. Data Collection
The experimental procedure for this study is centered on providing different person-hour
estimates and potential risks to different project activities. Data will consist of experience and
feedback from peers in the nuclear power industry.
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1.7. Expected Results and Criteria for Evaluating Results
The final product consists of a scope-specific case study that can be customized for
specific project scopes. A project work breakdown along with cost estimates and activity
durations are provided. The criteria to be used to evaluate the results are as follows:
1. Is the case study comprehensive enough that it can be used by an entry-level
engineer to develop a design project?
2. Can the case study be modified to accommodate different applications or scopes?
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review for this doctoral dissertation focuses on subjects such as the history
of nuclear power plants in the U.S., projects, knowledge, risk, and resilience. Each topic is
reviewed to gain the necessary background to develop and justify this research project.
The Nuclear Power Plants Overview section gives a broad synopsis of nuclear power
plants in the U.S. and a brief description of plant designs such as pressurized water reactors and
boiling water reactors. The primary purpose of this section is to provide the reader with the
necessary background information to follow this research project. The Accidents in the Nuclear
Industry section discusses the nuclear events that have shaped the U.S. nuclear industry; the
Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986), and most recently, the Fukushima Daiichi (2011)
event, are discussed. The License Renewal section provides a brief description of the license
renewal process in the U.S. and outlines how it is addressed by nuclear utilities. The governance
of large multi-firm projects section describes the interaction of multiple firms working on a
single project for nuclear power plants. The project cost and schedule section provide an
overview of how educated guesses on cost and schedule affect project's overall risks. The
strategic fit section discusses how strategic fit affects the success of a company. The subsequent
sections focus on the topic of resilience and how it relates to economic effects, human
performance, and the human reliability analysis. These sections are followed by a discussion of
risk for multi-unit nuclear power plants. The topic of knowledge management within the nuclear
industry is later discussed. This literature review concludes by considering the Delivering the
Nuclear Promise strategic plan and the Standard Design Process, which is the focus of this
research project's case study.
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2.1. Nuclear Power Plants Overview
Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) are power generating stations that use radioactive material
(i.e., uranium) to produce heat in a nuclear reactor. There are two types of NPPs in operation
within the United States (U.S.): boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurized water reactors
(PWRs). There is a total of 99 NPPs licensed to operate in the U.S. of which 34 are BWRs and
65 are PWRs (NRC, 2017). The locations of the plants are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Location of U.S. Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (NRC, 2017)
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BWR plants consist of one thermodynamic cycle composed mainly of a reactor, reactor
coolant pumps, feed pumps, turbines, condenser, and a generator. Within the reactor water is
boiled, therefore the term BWR, and steam is produced. Since there is only one cycle the steam
used to move the turbine is contaminated (i.e., radioactive). A PWR plant consists of two
thermodynamic cycles. The first cycle includes the reactor, reactor coolant pumps, feed pumps,
steam generators, and a pressurizer. The second cycle consists of the steam generators, turbines,
condenser, and the generator. Water is heated to elevated temperatures in the reactor and
maintained at high pressure by the pressurizer to avoid boiling. The steam generators use the hot
water (i.e., reactor coolant) to produce steam. The reactor coolant flows through the inside of the
steam generator tubes, and the steam flows through the outside of the tubes; therefore, the
contamination of the reactor coolant is not transferred to the steam.
Nuclear power is considered clean and reliable energy since no greenhouse gases are
released, and power is generated at high-efficiency levels. Because of its highly radioactive fuel
and significant consequences in case of an accident, safety is the foremost important aspect of
nuclear technology.

2.2. Accidents within the Nuclear Power Industry
In the history of NPPs, there have been a series of accidents that have shaped the
industry. The most significant being Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986), and most
recently, Fukushima Daiichi (2011).
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Three Mile Island (1979) – The Three Mile Island (TMI) NPP is a two (2) unit
PWR plant located near Middletown, PA (Figure 3). The TMI unit 2 accident is
so far the most serious nuclear accident in the history of the United States. The
cause of the accident was a combination of personnel error, design deficiencies,
and component failures (NRC, 2014), which created a deficiency in the plant’s
cooling system that led to a partial meltdown of the reactor core and a small
release of radioactivity.

Figure 3. Three Mile Island Plant Layout (NRC, 2014)
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Chernobyl (1986) – The Chernobyl NPP was a 4 unit pressurized water-cooled
reactor plant (unique soviet RBMK-1000 design) located in Chernobyl, Ukraine
(Figure 4). The Chernobyl Unit 4 accident caused by a sudden surge of power,
destroyed the reactor and released massive amounts of radioactive material into
the environment (NRC, 2014).

Figure 4. Chernobyl RBMK 1000 Plant Layout (NEA and OECD; 2002)
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Fukushima Daiichi (2011) – The Fukushima Daiichi NPP is a 6-unit BWR plant
located in the Futaba District of Fukushima Prefecture, Japan (Figure 5). The
cause of the Fukushima accident was a 9.0 magnitude earthquake that created a
15-meter tsunami. The events caused loss of offsite power to the station and
eventually the partial meltdown of 3 reactors and off-site release of radioactive
material.

Figure 5. Fukushima Daiichi Accident (FEPC, 2018)
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The Fukushima Daiichi event in 2011 is the most recent nuclear event. In
March 2011 a 9.0 magnitude earthquake created a 15-meter tsunami that struck
the shore of Japan. At the time of the earthquake, 11 reactors from four plants
were in operation in Japan. All of the reactors proved to be seismically robust by
automatically shutting down and following emergency procedures. Right after the
earthquake, the 15-meter (i.e., 49.2-ft) tsunami struck. The flooding caused a loss
of offsite power at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. As a result, the emergency diesel
generators took over powering the plant and supporting the plant cooling efforts.
The tsunami caused flooding which eventually took the diesel generators out of
service, impeding the cooling efforts. Even though alternate methods were
implemented, such as dumping sea water in the damaged reactors, the strategies
were not sufficient. The lack of cooling water caused the fuel to overheat and
eventually caused a core meltdown which later initiated the release of radioactive
material. Most of the radioactive releases were created by the lack of cooling
water on fuel stored in the spent fuel pool.
As a result of the Fukushima event, the U.S. NRC activated and staffed its
Emergency Operations Center in Maryland to closely monitor the Japan events
and assess the potential impact on U.S. nuclear plants and materials (NRC, 2015).
The NRC also established a taskforce to determine lessons learned from the
accident and determine if any NRC regulations needed additional measures to
ensure the safety of nuclear power plants in the U.S. This taskforce created a
series of recommendations which consist of a series of walkdowns and
modifications to be done at the nuclear power plants. As a result of the taskforce

15
recommendations, the NRC issued the first regulatory requirement based on
lessons learned from the Fukushima event in the form of Order EA-12-051,
“Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation”. Since then, projects have been developed, and are being
implemented, at nuclear power plants to comply with this NRC order.
All of the described accidents have a shared variable; they all shaped the U.S. nuclear
industry we have today. The Three Mile Island accident resulted in the establishment of the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (NRC, 2014), founded in December 1979 (INPO, 2017).
The Chernobyl accident resulted in improvements to nuclear reactors’ operating and emergency
procedures. The Fukushima accident resulted in the issuance of order EA-12-049, Issuance of
Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis
External Events, on March 12, 2012. This order imposes the need for guidance and strategies to
prevent fuel damage in the reactor and spent fuel pool (SFP) with a loss of power, motive force
and normal access to the Ultimate Heat Sink. The NRC provided an acceptable approach which
was outlined in Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2012-01 issued in August 2012. The Interim
Staff Guidance endorses the methodologies described in NEI 12-06 Revision 0, Diverse and
Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, with exceptions, additions, and
clarifications. Plants in the U.S. approached the order differently but all developed FLEX
strategies to implement it.
The process of updating plants to support these strategies required extensive project
management efforts and collaboration between organizations and firms. The following section
discusses the governance of large multi-firm projects such as FLEX.

16
2.3. Governance of Large Multi-Firm Projects
The 2011 paper, “A new governance approach for multi-firm projects: Lessons from
Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3 nuclear power plant projects,” by Ruuska et al., focuses on the
construction projects of the Olkiluoto 3 plant in Finland and the Flamanville 3 plant in France.
Both plants are turnkey plants supplied by Areva, a French nuclear company. For the projects to
take place, in both instances, various other entities or companies were involved including the
builders, owner, regulating agencies, and turbine suppliers. One of the essential aspects discussed
in this paper is how relationships between the entities involved in the project affect the overall
result of the project. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the supply networks of the Olkiluoto 3 and
Flamanville 3 projects. Even though the Flamanville 3 network is more complex (i.e., more
relationships) the project was more successful than the Olkiluoto 3. The reason for this mainly
was the good relationship between Électricité de France (EDF), the owner and architect/engineer,
and Areva, the nuclear supplier. Both of these are French companies that have worked together
on previous projects. Therefore, they understand how one another work, and they work together
to deliver a successful project. In the case of Olkiluoto 3, Teollisuunden Voina (TVO), the
owner, had never worked with Areva, making this a first-of-a-kind relationship.
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Figure 6. The supply network of the Olkiluoto 3 project (Ruuska et al., 2011)

Figure 7. The supply network of the Flamanville 3 project (Ruuska et al., 2011)
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The paper concludes by giving four implications for changes in governing large projects
that may possess the potential for enhancing both effectiveness and efficiency within large and
complex projects (Ruuska et al., 2011). These are (Ruuska et al., 2011):
1. shift focus from a hierarchical contact organization to a supply network
organization,
2. project governance should shift from price and mechanism to relationships and
self-regulation,
3. view large multi-firm projects as incorporated in the business interest and not as
temporary endeavors, and
4. focus on an open system view of managing projects instead of a narrow view.
The application of these implications to a design modification can improve the efficiency of such
projects. At the same time, some of the potentials risks involved with the interaction of various
firms can be mitigated or even eliminated, therefore improving the project’s cost and schedule.

2.4. Project Cost and Schedule
In his 2014 paper, “In the Land of the Blind the One-Eyed Man is King: Using Advanced
Scheduling and Simulation Techniques to Control Project Risk,” Shannon describes how
estimating cost and schedule are all educated guesses (2014), and not accurate or realistic
representations of how long the projects are going to last, or how much they are going to cost. He
also describes how the accuracy can be enhanced by dividing a big project into smaller
manageable scopes. Therefore, by better “guessing” the smaller scopes we can come up with
better “guesses” for the overall project, just by adding the smaller scopes up. The downside of
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following this approach is that rounding up errors are accumulated and can inflate the final
estimates for the projects.
Later, Shannon describes how errors in estimation can be introduced into project
estimates by using the following project management methods: analogy, parametric estimates,
historical data, expert opinion, and the “Delphi” technique. All of these methods are likely to
introduce errors due to, most commonly, lack of data appropriate to the domain being estimated
(Shannon, 2014). The best way to overcome this issue is to not use single-value data; instead,
data ranges are most appropriate. Shannon describes that data ranges should consider a minimum
value, a most likely value, and a pessimistic “worst case” value (2014).
All of the errors discussed that could be introduced into an estimate, build up into the
uncertainty of that estimate. Another uncertainty is added by risks. These risks can be
categorized as technical, cost, and schedule risks. These risks can be managed by the following
six steps:
1. identify the risks,
2. document the risks,
3. characterize the risks,
4. prioritize the risks,
5. develop risk management strategies, and
6. monitor and control risks.
Regarding identifying risks, considering risk scenarios instead of single risks gives results
that are closer to reality (T.-H. Nguyen et al., 2013). After these steps are followed, a more
comprehensive estimate for cost and schedule can be developed that includes the effects of the
identified risks. This results in better estimates that are more than just “educated guesses.”
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2.5. Representations of Nuclear Risk
In the paper, “Environments, Risks, and the Limits of Representation: Examples from
Nuclear Energy and Some Implications of Fukushima,” Kinsella (2012) discusses how risks in
the nuclear industry, concerning unusual events, are often not represented correctly. Because of
this, some of the events are sometimes under or overestimated. An example given, not directly
related to nuclear power, is the production of nuclear warheads for the Cold War. The number of
warheads needed was considerably overestimated (Kinsella, 2012). Under or overestimation can
mainly occur when there is not enough knowledge on a topic to model, or estimate, the work.
Regarding nuclear power, Kinsella continues by discussing the effects of the Fukushima
events on the industry. He explains how lessons learned from the Fukushima events only focus
on the triggering events of earthquake and tsunamis but fail to identify other possible events due
to the lack of knowledge. Therefore, the representation of this risk is limited only to the known
information.

2.6. Strategic Fit
Van Aduard de Marcedo-Soares et al. (2009) discuss in their paper, “Strategic Fit of
Project Management at a Brazilian State-Owned Firm: The Case of Electronuclear,” how project
management strategic fit affect the success of a firm or company. In the paper, Van Aduard de
Marcedo-Soares et al. give the example of the Brazilian nuclear firm Eletrobrás Termonuclear
S.A. – Eletronuclear, or just Eletronuclear. The article shows how the lack of strategic fit ends up
having a negative impact [on a company’s] performance and competitiveness (Marcedo-Soares
et al., 2009). The research focused on employee interviews to understand the firm’s
organizational culture and characterize employee’s perception of strategic fit. Various
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weaknesses on the organization were identified. One of those weaknesses is the lack of project
management culture, involving policies, procedures and best project management practices
(Marcedo-Soares et al., 2009). Within the nuclear industry, procedure use and adherence is one
of the human performance safety culture’s most important behaviors.

2.7. Resilience and Economic Effects
Dalziell and McManus describe the economic effects of events on organizations in their
2004 paper on resilience, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity. They also emphasize the need for
resilient organizations to have resilient communities. The first step to evaluate these
organizations is to apply a system analysis since organizations are dynamic complex systems.
The most important aspect is not to isolate components; instead, analyze components as a whole
since understanding the relationships between various components in a system is the best way to
analyze the system. System resilience is composed of two main terms, vulnerability and adaptive
capacity.
Vulnerability – the human product of any physical exposure to a disaster that
results in some degree of loss, combined with the human capacity to withstand,
prepare for and recover from that same event (Dalziell and McManus, 2004).
Adaptive Capacity – reflects the ability of the system to respond to changes in its
external environment, and to recover from damage to internal structures within
the system that affect its ability to achieve its purpose (Dalziell and McManus,
2004).
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Dalziell and McManus (2004) also describe resilience as the overarching goal of a system
to continue to function to the fullest possible extent in the face of stress to achieve its purpose,
where resilience is a function of both the vulnerability of the system and its adaptive capacity.
They also describe vulnerability and adaptive capacity as the ease with which the individual,
community or organization is pushed into this new state is a measure of their vulnerability, while
the degree to which they can cope with that change is a measure of their adaptive capacity. These
concepts are shown in Figure 8. The relationship between resilience and recovery is also
discussed. Figure 9 describes the relationship.

Figure 8. Relationship between vulnerability and adaptive capacity of a system in relation to a
disaster event (Dalziell and McManus, 2004)
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Figure 9. Relationship between organizational resilience and recovery (Dalziell and McManus,
2004)

Overall system resilience is then evaluated using an organization’s key performance
indicators (KPIs) and the effects of changes in those indicators as a relationship of time. The area
under the ΔKPI versus time curve is designated as the organization’s (i.e., the system’s)
resilience (Figure 10).
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Figure 10. Impact on KPIs as a measure of system resilience (Dalziell and McManus, 2004)

For Nuclear Power Plants the term Key Performance Indicator is directly related to the
concept of Human Performance (HU).

2.8. Resilience and Human Performance
Resilience engineering suggests that a company must recognize, adapt to, and absorb
challenges that fall outside the scope of its design and historical experiences (Huber et al., 2008).
This is also the main purpose of Human Performance (HU). As shown in INPO’s Performance
Improvement (PI) Model (INPO, 2006), Figure 11, the main areas of HU are performance
monitoring (finding gaps); analyzing, identifying, and planning solutions (analyzing actions);
and finally implementing solutions (fixing results).

25

Figure 11. INPO’s Performance Improvement Model (INPO, 2006)

McManus, Seville, Vargo, and Brunsdon (2008) define resilience of an organization as a
function of the overall situation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities, and
adaptive capacity of an organization in a complex, dynamic, and interdependent environment. As
mentioned previously, a nuclear power plant is a complex, dynamic, and interdependent
environment. Now, let’s look closely at this definition of organizational resilience and the
various HU tools that satisfy it.
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2.8.1. Overall Situational Awareness
Tools such as task-review, technical task review, job-site review, questioning attitude,
and three-way communications, all under the fundamental HU tools for workers, engineers and
knowledge workers, describe the overall situational awareness variable. When looking at INPO’s
PI model, we can locate resilience overall situational awareness under the performance
monitoring area.

2.8.2. Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities
Tools such as pre-job briefing, concurrent verification, turnover, and post-job reviews, all
under the conditional and verification HU tools for workers, engineers and knowledge workers,
address the management of keystone vulnerabilities variable. This variable is the analyzing,
identifying, and planning solutions under INPO’s PI model. This variable also involves the
tracking and trending of HU KPIs.

2.8.3. Adaptive Capacity
Adaptive capacity is closely related to the communication of HU KPIs and is the
implementing solutions area under INPO’s PI model. By communicating HU events and HU
clock resets, personnel become aware of the HU status in their plant and/or department and
become more conscious of error likely situations. By doing this, events can be prevented.
Through communication, interim solutions and corrective actions to previous events are also
shared.
Human Performance can be incorporated into the analysis of resilience by integrating it
to the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). HRA is characterized by the NRC (2005) as the lack
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of consistency among practitioners on the treatment of human performance in the context of a
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).

2.9. Resilience and Human Reliability Analysis
Resilience is directly related human reliability analysis (HRA). Boring (2010) defines
human error as any action or inaction on the part of an individual that decreases the safety of the
system with which he or she is interacting. HRA consists of three different stages:


Modeling of the potential contributors to human error



Identification of the potential contributor to human error, and



Quantification of human errors

In the human factors world, HRA is considered unique since it focuses on prediction
rather than description. HRA predicts vulnerabilities in human actions. These vulnerabilities are
then analyzed to establish recovery actions which feed into resilience engineering. Boring (2010)
considers resilience engineering as a young field that has attracted considerable attention already
and is being heralded as a significant way of thinking about safety. He also describes the basis of
resilience engineering as a science to optimize safety, not to undermine existing safety.
Resilience engineering is a complementary undertaking of HRA. HRA’s primary purpose
is the human recovery to achieve system safety, which is the main purpose of resilience
engineering. Boring (2010) describes what each of the methods brings to the other.
What HRA brings to resilience:


Quantitative emphasis



Performance shaping factors



Systemic view

28
What resilience brings to HRA:


Unexampled events



Dynamic events

The interactions between resilience and HRA are the characterization of system safety.
Overall, by improving the HRA terms within a PRA model, the resilience of a nuclear power
plant can be achieved.

2.10. Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Risk
Multi-unit risk has recently become a topic of interest when it comes to PRA and is also
known as multi-unit probabilistic risk assessment (MUPRA). Kim et al. (2016) define multi-unit
risk as the risk associated with multiple units regardless of the types of radiological sources (i.e.,
reactor or spent fuel pool).
Based on a recent study of U.S. license event reports (LERs) submitted to the NRC
between 2000 and 2011, 9% of the LERs submitted affected multiple sites with the most
common cause of these events being organizational dependencies. This percent accounted for
41% of the total 9% (Kim et al., 2016). Some of the organizational dependencies that are
directly related to the design phase of a project include (Kim et al., 2016):


Design issue that affects multiple units



Incorrect calculation that is used on multiple units



Incorrect technical specifications that have been mirrored for multiple units



Incorrect engineering judgment that has been applied to multiple units



Poor safety culture which leads to errors of judgment and execution across the
organization
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Latent failures present in the site systems, structures, and components (SSCs)
(e.g., design issues or incorrect engineering analysis applied to multiple units,
maintenance errors repeated on several units).

Even though all of the mentioned organizational dependencies are relevant to the design
phase of nuclear projects, latent failures in the site SSCs might be the most important one. Aside
from natural events that can affect multiple units, regardless of the site, common SSCs between
units pose the greatest risk of failure and can be the cause of the rest of the organizational
dependencies.
Out of the 100 NPPs licensed to operate in the U.S., 25 are single-unit sites, nine units are
part of a three-unit site (3 sites), and 66 units are part of dual-unit sites (33 sites) (NRC, 2017).
As of early 2018 there are no sites with more than 3 operating units in the U.S. Soon, as early as
2020, with the construction of the Units 3 and 4 at Vogtle in Georgia, the U.S. will count with 25
single-unit sites, 62 units in dual-unit sites (31 sites), 9 units in three-unit sites (3 sites), and 4
units in a four-unit site (1 site), not accounting for any plant closures in the near future. This new
scenario will make Vogtle a one of a kind site in the U.S.
With the soon to be U.S. nuclear fleet panorama, multi-unit risk (see Figure 12 for
example) is more relevant than ever. Human errors made during the design phase of projects,
while they are less influential than the general external events in terms of area and scope (Heo et
al., 2016), still pose a great risk of latent failures. Measures need to be put in place to identify
these risks early in the design process.
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Figure 12. Example of Multi-Unit Risk

2.11. Nuclear Knowledge Management
Knowledge is the correct interpretation of data (Yanev, 2013). The management of
nuclear knowledge has become an ongoing issue in the commercial nuclear power industry. This
issue emerges from the fact that the nuclear power workforce is aging. The most knowledgeable
workers within the industry, many of whom have dedicated their entire professional careers to
nuclear and have been around since the design and construction of the majority of nuclear power
plants in the U.S., are retiring and taking with them years of knowledge and experience.
Even though processes within the nuclear industry are usually captured in documents
such as industry guidelines and procedures (i.e., explicit knowledge (IAEA, 2004)), tacit
knowledge is not captured. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2004) defines tacit
knowledge as knowledge that is held in a person’s mind. This knowledge is not typically
captured or documented and is easy to lose. This tacit knowledge is typically kept by retiring
employees and is rarely transferred to new or upcoming employees. The safety of existing and
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new power plants will directly depend on how we preserve, transfer and further grow nuclear
knowledge and expertise worldwide (Yanev, 2013).
One way of retaining tacit knowledge within an organization is to create programs that
facilitate the transfer of knowledge. This information can be transferred through training or
mentoring. Even though the new nuclear workforce is required to have formal training, this
training or education is just the beginning of the training process and much hands-on practical
experience is also necessary to gain the required competence (Yanev, 2013) to operate a nuclear
power plant safely. On the other hand, mentoring is a key approach to knowledge transfer, which
allows for both the explicit and tacit aspects of knowledge to be transferred (Pollack, 2012).
Another way of capturing tacit knowledge is by documenting the knowledge, which is the
purpose of this case study, to capture the knowledge related to the development of engineering
design projects as a knowledge retention tool for the U.S. nuclear power industry.

2.12. Delivering the Nuclear Promise and the Standard Design Process
Delivering the Nuclear Promise is a strategic plan developed by nuclear energy facilities
in the U.S. and led by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to strengthen the industry’s
commitment to excellence in safety and reliability. It assures future viability through efficiency
improvements, and drives regulatory and market changes so that nuclear energy facilities are
fully recognized for their value (NEI, 2017). In the strategic plan three focus strategies are
identified: maintain operational focus, increased value, and improve efficiency (NEI, 2016). As a
result of these strategies, four building blocks were developed. These are (NEI, 2016):


Building Block 1: Analyze cost drivers and identify opportunities to improve
efficiency.
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Building Block 2: Leverage federal and state policies to ensure monetary
recognition of nuclear energy’s value.



Building Block 3: Redesign nuclear power plant processes to improve efficiency
while advancing the fundamentals of safe, reliable operation.



Building Block 4: Implement a communications strategy to ensure industry
engagement in the initiative.

This case study is directly related to building block 3. One of the objectives of this
building block is to develop procedures and processes to facilitate discrete industry efficiency
initiatives (NEI, 2016). One of these processes is the engineering design process.
As part of the Delivering the Nuclear Process strategy, NEI has issued a series of more
than 40 efficiency bulletins (NEI, 2017) including graded approach to walkdowns (EB 16-02),
optimizing FLEX equipment preventive maintenance strategies (EB 16-17), standardization of
in-processing training (EB 16-26b), and standard design change process (EB 17-06), among
others. Efficiency Bulletin 17-06 (NEI, 2017), Implement Standard Design Process, provides a
detailed description of this efficiency opportunity. One of the reasons for implementing this
change, which applies to the entire industry, is to address the administrative burden and
complexity for developing design changes (i.e., streamline the design process), and avoid
increased costs and project delays. As it pertains to AE companies, one of the reasons to
implement this change is to avoid having to maintain unique procedures and training to each
fleet or site. The selection of design change types is also addressed. This study focusses on full
design changes.
The Standard Design Process (SDP) is described in Nuclear Industry Procedure IP-ENG001 (2017), issued by the Standard Design Process Steering Committee (SDPSC). This
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procedure is meant to be used in conjunction with site-specific procedures and is based on
standard industry guidance, expectations, and operating experience (SDPSC, 2017). The SDP
covers guidance for the:


Initial Scoping Phase



Conceptual/Common Design Phase



Detailed Design Phase (i.e., for Design Equivalent Change, Commercial Change,
and Design Phase)



Planning Phase



Installation/Testing Phase, and



Design Closure Phase

The scope of this case study will focus on the Initial Scoping Phase, the
Conceptual/Common Design Phase, and the Detailed Design Phase for a full design change since
it is the most comprehensive of all the change types. This new process will be incorporated into
Chapter 4 of this case study.

2.13. Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal
In the United States, nuclear power plants were originally licensed for 40 years. This
licensing time limit was chosen as default and was a result of the projected lifetime of fossil
plants (Weinberg, 2004), which was the closest benchmark available. Later, the industry
determined that nuclear plants were suited to operate for more than 40 years. This resulted in the
publication of the original license renewal rule by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in
1991, 10 CFR Part 54. An amended license renewal rule was later issued in 1995.
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The license renewal rule governs the issuance of renewed operating licenses and renewed
combined licenses for nuclear power plants licensed pursuant to Sections 103 or 104b of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
(NRC, 2017). This rule allows nuclear power plants to renew their operating licenses for an
additional period of 20 years. The rule also allows for subsequent renewals of 20-year intervals.
By the time this report is issued, 84 plants have completed their license renewal application
process, leaving 15 plants with applications under review, as future submittals, or with no intent
to submit. Appendix A shows a detailed list of nuclear power plants licensed to operate in the
U.S. and their license renewal status.
The scope of a plant’s license renewal is determined by performing an Integrated Plant
Assessment (IPA). This assessment identifies the SSCs (and their functions) requiring aging
management to ensure they will be managed to maintain the current licensing basis (CLB) and to
ensure that there is an acceptable level of safety during the period of extended operation (NRC,
2017). These SSCs are (NRC, 2017):
1) Those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events
(as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions:
i.

The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;

ii.

The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown
condition; or

iii.

The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which
could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to
in § 50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of 10 CFR, as applicable.
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2) All nonsafety-related systems, structures, and components whose failure could
prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in 1).
3) All systems, structures, and components relied on in safety analyses or plant
evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the
Commission's regulations for fire protection (10 CFR 50.48), environmental
qualification (10 CFR 50.49), pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61),
anticipated transients without scram (10 CFR 50.62), and station blackout (10
CFR 50.63).
The scope of the IPA typically becomes the scope of a plant’s Aging Management Program
(AMP).
A portion of the IPA for license renewal consists of component scoping and screening
evaluation, and Aging Management Review (AMR), of a specific system. This is performed for
mechanical components, electrical components, and structures. The component scoping and
screening evaluation determines which passive long-lived system components are within the
scope of the AMP and subject to an AMR. This is typically done by reviewing P&IDs (i.e.,
process and instrumentation drawings) and performing system walkdowns to confirm P&ID data.
The AMR demonstrates that the effects of aging are adequately managed such that the
component’s intended function will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period beyond
the 40-year plant design basis. The AMR does the following:
1. Identifies components’ intended functions – For mechanical components intended
functions may be pressure boundary and heat transfer, among others.
2. Identifies components’ materials of construction – These may be divided into
subcomponents depending on material types. For example, a valve may have a
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carbon steel body subcomponent and a stainless steel bonnet subcomponent. A
heat exchanger may be divided into shell, tubes, and tube sheet.
3. Identifies components’ internal and external operating environments – Some of
the environments typically applied are air, air with borated water leakage, raw
water, treated water, lubricating oil, soil, and concrete.
4. Assigns AMR groupings (i.e., material and environment combinations), both
internal and external – These are identified using guidance from the Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) described in NEI 95-10. An example of an AMR grouping
may be carbon steel in treated water.
5. Determines aging effects requiring management – Some of these are the loss of
material (e.g., crevice corrosion, pitting corrosion, general corrosion,
microbiological induced corrosion, and cracking, among others).
6. Identifies the programs that will be employed to manage the aging effects – These
are identified using guidance described in NUREG-1801 by the NRC, also known
as the GALL Report (i.e., Generic Aging Lessons Learned). Some examples of
the programs that may apply to mechanical components are Flow Accelerated
Corrosion (i.e., XI.M17, referring to the GALL chapter), Boric Acid Corrosion
(i.e., XI.M10), External Surfaces Monitoring of Mechanical Components (i.e.,
XI.M38), and Water Chemistry (i.e., XI.M2).
The process just described is later used to implement an AMP at nuclear power plants.
The AMP consists of a series of activities based on the format provided in NEI 95-10 for
managing the effects of aging on components (INPO, 2015). The key aspects of the AMP are
monitoring or inspecting parameters, acceptance criteria, detection of aging effects, preventive
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actions, trending, and application of operating experience. As it pertains to engineering
modifications, acceptance criteria are the most relevant aspects of the AMP. When acceptance
criteria are not met, corrective actions, such as replacement through engineering modifications,
need to be put in place to ensure that SSCs are maintained under all CLB design conditions
during the period of extended operation, therefore ensuring the longevity of the nuclear power
plant.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The following sections describe the methodology to be used to develop a case study for
the design phase of engineering projects for nuclear power plants. The research questions,
research environment, and experimental procedures will be discussed.

3.1. Methodological design and rationale for the design
The development of this engineering design case study is divided in three parts. Part I
(Section 4.1), Work Breakdown Structure, displays a comprehensive work breakdown structure
for an engineering project. The information consists of a list of activities that will need to occur
throughout the life of an engineering design modification project until completion of the design
package. Each activity is descriptive and broken down into sub-activities. The activities range
from the development of the project scope to the implementation and close-out of the project.
Activities relevant to the development of a conceptual design package are later identified. These
activities are the foundation of Part II.
Part II (Section 4.2) of this case study, Activity Definitions and Estimates, consists of
providing descriptions to the activities identified in Part I. Person-hour estimates are also
assigned. The descriptions and estimates provided are based on a hypothetical project scope
defined in Section 4.2 of this case study. This section provides information such as:


responsible resource,



estimated person-hours needed to complete the activity,



possible interactions with other resources,



required reviews or oversight,
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relationship to other activities, and



required procedures or forms to be completed.

The results of Part II are captured in tables within Section 4.2 and in a project schedule
developed using the Microsoft Projects software. This information can later be used to develop
project costs and schedules for other projects.
Part III (Section 4.3), Risks, consists of evaluating each activity described in Part II and
identifying potential risks. The activities are evaluated using the Failure Modes and Effect
(FMEA) risk assessment tool. The third phase will also evaluate the resilience of the overall
project in order to identify potential cost and schedule obstacles.
The described methodology relates to the research questions as follows:
Research Question #1 – How does a comprehensive work breakdown structure for an
engineering design project within the nuclear industry look like?
In order to answer this question, a comprehensive list of activities has to be created.
Some of these activities include: development of a scope summary, identification of impacted
documents, installations instructions, development of drawings, and programs reviews. Subactivities should also be included in order to facilitate the development of person-hour estimate.
Research Question #2 – What should take place to deliver a successful project?
Each activity listed within the work breakdown structure should be supplemented with a
description of what it entails. Industry documents and specific plant procedures can also be
referenced within each activity description. Estimated person-hours required to complete each
activity should also be included, including responsible resources. Each activity should also
include, to the extent possible, lessons learned from industry documents or personal experience,
among others.
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Research Question #3 – What kind of risk could I face? What risk response can be identified?
How can these risks impact the overall success of the project?
The last portion of the case study will focus on what can go wrong with each individual
activity. To the extent possible, mitigating strategies for those identified risks should also be
provided. If mitigating strategies cannot be provided, then possible consequences of accepting
risks should be discussed.

3.2. Proposed Analysis
The experimental procedure for this study is based on identifying activities to be
completed within the development phase of an engineering design project in the nuclear industry,
describing the activities in detail, providing person-hour estimates for each activity and
identifying the potential risks each activity could encounter. The final product consists of a
comprehensive case study that can be customized based on specific project applications. Data
consists on experience and feedback from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the nuclear
industry.

3.3. Research Design and Methods
The design of the research and method to be applied is shown in Figure 1. The research
consists of three major parts. A Subject Matter Expert (SME) review is performed after each part
is developed.
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3.4. Subject Matter Expert Reviews
SME reviews consist of reviewing the content of a specific part. The scope of each
review consists of:


SME Review #1 – Review Part I, Work Breakdown Structure, of the case study
and provide comments and/or recommendations on how to improve the content
based on your experience with design engineering projects.



SME Review #2 – Review Part II, Activity Definitions and Estimates, of the case
study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how to improve the
content based on your experience with design engineering projects.



SME Review #3 – Review Part III, Risks, of the case study and provide
comments and/or recommendations on how to improve the content based on your
experience with design engineering projects.

Three SMEs have been chosen to perform the reviews. Each SME has previous
experience with design engineering projects within the U.S. nuclear power industry. SMEs are a
combination of civil/structural engineer, electrical/instrumentation and controls (I&C) engineer,
and project manager. A combination of these types of SMEs will guarantee reviews from
different perspectives. As part of the review, SMEs provided professional tittle (including
engineering discipline if applicable) and a brief description of their experience as it relates to
design engineering projects. A form, see Table 1, is provided to each SME to record this
information. A section for comments, including reference to applicable section of the report is
also provided. Finalized forms include resolution of comments from the author. Results from the
SME reviews are recorded in Appendix B (Part I), Appendix C (Part II), and Appendix D (Part
III) of the report.
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SME:
SME Title:
Description of SME Experience:

Scope: Review Part I of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on
how to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure

Comment/Recommendation

Table 1. Subject Matter Expert Review Form

Resolution
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The results of this case study are organized in three parts. Part one (4.1) provides a
detailed work breakdown structure (WBS) of the most common activities that would take place
during the design phase of an engineering design modification project (i.e., detailed design
phase). Part two (4.2) provides a specific scope of work for a nuclear power plant design
modification and describes activities to be completed as part of a conceptual design.
Recommended person-hour estimates and activity durations are assigned. The third and last part
(4.3) uses the Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) tool to identify and analyze potential risks for
each activity described in part two.

4.1. Part I: Work Breakdown Structure
Engineering design modification projects at nuclear power plants are a combination of
activities that range from the design of an SSC up to implementation. Various resources are
typically involved in the development of a project. Some of the dedicated resources are the
project manager (i.e., the overall project lead who focuses on schedule and budget), the
responsible engineer (i.e., the technical lead who serves as the primary point of contact for the
development of the design), and resource engineers (i.e., task or discipline-specific engineers,
also known as design team members by the SDP). Each project starts with the identification of
an issue. This issue is then evaluated by plant personnel to determine if a physical change to the
plant is required. Once the problem is evaluated, and a decision is made to make changes to the
plant, a request is sent to the engineering department to initiate a plant design modification. This
modification request eventually becomes an engineering project.
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If the required resources are available, nuclear power utilities typically perform design
modifications “in-house.” If these resources are not available, utilities reach out to external
companies to perform the work. This case study is based on an engineering design modification
developed for a hypothetical nuclear power plant by an external engineering company. The focus
of this case study is the development of a clearly-defined example of an engineering design
modification project from the perspective of a responsible engineer that is in the planning or
estimating stage of the technical portion of a conceptual design.
The following is a list of activities that should be considered when developing the WBS
for an engineering design modification project. This list is not comprehensive. Its primary
purpose is to provide a basis for this case study. A formal process, such as the Standard Design
Process (SDP) or a plant-specific design process should be followed to develop an accurate WBS
for a realistic project. The WBS presented here includes activities to be performed as part of a
detailed design change package (i.e., document). A portion of these activities is required to be
completed as part of a conceptual design package. These activities are identified by placing an
asterisk (*) next to each activity. Section 4.2 describes each of these activities. Section 4.2 also
describes the differences between a detailed design and a conceptual design based on the SDP.
A diagram of the WBS is presented in Figure 13 thru Figure 18.
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WBS.1. Engineering Design Modification
WBS.1.1. Define Project*
WBS.1.1.1. Obtain input from Customer and Project Manager
WBS.1.1.2. Problem Statement
WBS.1.1.3. Identify Resources Needed
WBS.1.1.4. Project Scope
WBS.1.1.3.1. Mechanical Engineering Scope
WBS.1.1.3.2. Electrical Engineering Scope
WBS.1.1.3.3. Civil/Structural Engineering Scope
WBS.1.1.3.4. Instrumentation and Controls (I&C)/Digital/Cyber Security
Scope
WBS.1.1.5. Proposed Design Change/Problem Resolution
WBS.1.1.6. Design Inputs
WBS.1.2. Identify New and/or Update Affected Design Documents*
WBS.1.2.1. Obtain Input from Customer’s Design Engineering
WBS.1.2.2. Identify Affected Design Documents
WBS.1.2.3. Identify New Design Documents to be Generated
WBS.1.2.4. Drawings
WBS.1.2.4.1. Update/Generate Drawings
WBS.1.2.4.2. Review/Approval
WBS.1.2.4.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.2.5. Calculations
WBS.1.2.5.1. Update/Generate Calculations
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WBS.1.2.5.2. Review/Verification/Approval
WBS.1.2.5.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.2.6. Technical Reports
WBS.1.2.6.1. Update/Generate Technical Report
WBS.1.2.6.2. Review/Verification/Approval
WBS.1.2.6.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.2.7. Specifications
WBS.1.2.7.1. Update/Generate Specifications
WBS.1.2.7.2. Review/Verification/Approval
WBS.1.2.7.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.2.8. Procedures (e.g., plant operating procedures)
WBS.1.2.8.1. Update/Generate Administrative and Installation Procedures
WBS.1.2.8.2. Review/Verification/Approval
WBS.1.2.8.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.2.9. Training Materials
WBS.1.2.9.1. Update/Generate Training Materials
WBS.1.2.9.2. Review/Verification/Approval
WBS.1.2.9.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.2.10. Design Basis Documents
WBS.1.2.10.1. Update/Generate Design Basis Documents
WBS.1.2.10.2. Review/Verification/Approval
WBS.1.2.10.3. Submit for Processing
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WBS.1.2.11. Other Documents (e.g., data sheets, components lists, supplier
documents)
WBS.1.2.11.1. Update/Generate Other Documents
WBS.1.2.11.2. Review/Verification/Approval
WBS.1.2.11.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.3. Installation Instructions*
WBS.1.3.1. Obtain Input from Installing Group or Vendor
WBS.1.3.2. Detailed Instructions
WBS.1.3.2.1. Obtain Input from Installing Group (i.e., constructability
review)
WBS.1.3.2.2. Obtain Input from Supplier/Manufacturer
WBS.1.3.3. Bill of Materials
WBS.1.3.3.1. Obtain Input from Customer (e.g., procurement, engineering,
installing group)
WBS.1.3.3.2. Obtain Input from Supplier/Manufacturer
WBS.1.3.4. Testing Instructions
WBS.1.3.4.1. Obtain Input from Customer (e.g., test group)
WBS.1.3.4.2. Obtain Input from Supplier/Manufacturer
WBS.1.3.5. Submit for Implementation
WBS.1.4. 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Review*
WBS.1.4.1. Obtain Input from Licensing Group
WBS.1.4.2. Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Impacts
WBS.1.4.2.1. Identify Recommended Changes to the SAR
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WBS.1.4.2.2. Review/Approval
WBS.1.4.2.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.4.3. Technical Specification Impacts
WBS.1.4.3.1. Update Technical Specification
WBS.1.4.3.2. Review/Approval
WBS.1.4.3.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.4.4. Operating License Impacts
WBS.1.4.4.1. Identify Recommended Changes to the Operating License
WBS.1.4.4.2. Review/Approval
WBS.1.4.4.3. Submit for Processing
WBS.1.4.5. Submit to Licensing Group
WBS.1.5. Programs Impact*
WBS.1.5.1. Obtain Input from Program Owners and/or System Engineers
WBS.1.5.2. Cumulative Effects
WBS.1.5.3. Database Changes
WBS.1.5.4. Preventive Maintenance
WBS.1.5.5. Additional Information to Support Design
WBS.1.5.6. Other Site-Specific Requirements
WBS.1.5.7. Review/Approval
WBS.1.6. Project Activities
WBS.1.6.1. Design Package Inter-Discipline Review/Verification
WBS.1.6.1.1. Internal/SMEs*
WBS.1.6.1.2. Customer/SMEs
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WBS.1.6.1.3. Professional Engineer
WBS.1.6.1.4. Human Performance/Risk
WBS.1.6.1.5. Verification
WBS.1.6.2. Meetings
WBS.1.6.2.1. Pre-Job Briefs*
WBS.1.6.2.2. Progress Updates
WBS.1.6.2.3. Technical/SME
WBS.1.6.2.4. Industry
WBS.1.6.2.5. Design Presentations*
WBS.1.6.3. Walkdowns*
WBS.1.6.3.1. Pre-Design
WBS.1.6.3.2.1. Obtain Input from Engineering
WBS.1.6.3.2. Post-Design/Constructability
WBS.1.6.3.2.2. Obtain Input from Implementing Group
WBS.1.6.4. Incorporate comments into design
WBS.1.6.5. Final signatures and approval
WBS.2. Implementation Phase
WBS.2.1. Work Order Creation/Support
WBS.2.2. Minor Changes to Design due to Implementation
WBS.2.3. Performance Test Acceptance Report Reviews
WBS.2.4. Return SSC to Service
WBS.2.5. Installation Support
WBS.2.4.1. Outage
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WBS.2.4.2. Non-Outage
WBS.3. Close-Out/Completion Phase
WBS.3.1. Tracking of Document Completion
WBS.3.2. Additional Documentation
WBS.3.3. Final Reviews/Approvals
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Figure 14. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Identify New and/or Update Affected Design
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Figure 15. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Installation Instructions
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Figure 16. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Review
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Figure 18. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Project Activities
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4.2. Part II: Activity Definitions and Estimates
The scope of an engineering design project, especially for a plant modification, can be
extensive, as shown in the WBS in Section 4.1. Therefore, projects are typically divided into
phases. The Standard Design Process (SDP; SDPSC, 2017), shown in Figure 19, identifies six
major design phases: initial scoping phase, conceptual/common design phase, detailed design
phase, planning phase, installation/testing phase, and design closure phase. The case study
presented here focuses on the SDP conceptual design phase (i.e., ~30% of the design (SDPSC,
2017)) shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 19. Standard Design Process Flowchart (SDPRC, 2017)
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Figure 19. Continued
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Figure 20. Conceptual/Common Design Phase Flowchart (SDPRC, 2017)
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By the time a project is assigned to a responsible engineer, especially one external to the
plant, the initial scoping phase has already been completed by plant personnel. The next phase is
the conceptual/common design phase. The common design phase applies to nuclear fleet-level
designs and evaluations (SDPSC, 2017) and will not be discussed since this case study is based
on a single unit plant.
Per the SDP (SDPSC, 2017), a conceptual design includes the following major elements:
1. Identification of the design scope,
2. Identification of team members,
3. Development of the preliminary design inputs, requirements, and deliverables.
During the conceptual design phase, the entire project structure can be delineated with more
accuracy; therefore, estimates for future phases can be refined. There is a risk of over-estimating
or under-estimating a project from beginning to end. Because of this, a phased approach is
preferable.
This case study describes a simplified WBS for a hypothetical project scope. It also
develops project estimates and schedules for a design modification performed for a hypothetical
nuclear power plant named Nuclear Plant 1. The purpose of this modification is to add a means
to use filtered water from the Filtered Water Tank (FWT) for alternative or emergency purposes.
The project focuses on the following overall scope:


Install a 6” drain line and valve to the FWT discharge line at Nuclear Plant 1, a
single unit plant. The FWT is a non-nuclear safety related (NNS) tank containing
filtered water.



The new line is classified as NNS.
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One P&ID is required to be updated. This P&ID is also a figure on the plant’s
Safety Analysis Report (SAR).



One pipe support is needed to support the new line.



No wall penetrations are required.



The responsible engineer for the project will be a mechanical engineer.



One (1) civil/structural resource engineer will be involved in the project.



The conceptual design shall be completed in 12 weeks.



Project weeks are 40-hour weeks, five (5) days per week, and seven (7) hours
each day (i.e., approximately 87% utilization).



25% of the total allotted time will be assigned to the resource engineer.

The descriptions of each activity and person-hour estimates to complete the activities are
discussed. As stated previously, this case study will focus on activity descriptions and personhour estimates for the development of a conceptual design.

4.2.1. Pre-Job Brief
As defined by Davenport (2005), knowledge workers have high degrees of expertise,
education, or experience, and the primary purpose of their jobs involves the creation,
distribution, or application of knowledge. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
classifies engineers as knowledge workers. In the 05-002 report, INPO provides a list of tools
that can be applied to anticipate, prevent, and catch in-process errors (INPO, 2005). All of these
tools are important to developing a high-quality product and should be applied throughout the
life of a project. The pre-job briefing tool is an essential tool to apply at the beginning of any
project and is discussed here.
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A pre-job brief is a discussion held by the responsible engineer and their responsible
supervisor to (INPO, 2005):
1. To ensure the engineer is qualified to perform the assigned task,
2. To prepare the engineer for what to accomplish, and
3. To sensitize the engineer to what to avoid and to identify and compensate for
error-likely situations that could lead to the product jeopardizing the plant or
person.
The pre-job brief is the first step to ensure a project is being developed the right way from the
beginning. Always ensure your direct supervisor organizes or schedules a pre-job brief before the
start of any activity such as planning and estimating the effort to develop a conceptual design
package. Pre-job briefs should be used every time an activity is started and can be led by
responsible supervisors, project managers, and responsible engineers alike. A pre-job brief is a
tool that can also be used to reduce activity risks as shown in the risk analysis performed in
Section 4.3.

4.2.2. Procedure Use and Adherence
The next step on any project, especially a nuclear plant modification project, is to identify
applicable procedures or documents, and their latest revisions or versions. The controlled (i.e.,
revision or version approved for use) documents can be found in the plant’s controlled document
repository. As a good practice, never rely on printed procedures or documents that have been
saved on local folders or personal computer desktops. These are not controlled and can contain
old information. During the life of a project controlled documents may change, or not change at
all. Always ensure that the latest procedures and forms are being used or submitted with project
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deliverables and that the latest versions of documents are being used for updates. Failing to do so
may cause schedule or operability issues. The same concept applies to training and
qualifications. Management and individual project contributors should always ensure that
training and qualifications are current before assigning or starting work.

4.2.3. Project Definition and Pre-Design Walkdown
The first deliverable on any project should be to define the project scope. The overall
scope of the project is defined in the initial scoping phase. During the development of the
conceptual design phase, the scope is expanded to include technical details. The definition of the
scope should always start with a walkdown and discussions with customer key stakeholders to
understand the entire assignment, especially to outline the technical information.
Pre-design walkdowns are essential to define a project and to develop a design. The
purpose of this walkdown is to get familiar with the system or component that needs to be
modified and to give the engineer a sense of the magnitude of the work. Walkdowns are also
used to confirm information, especially from drawings. Even if a drawing is approved for use, it
does not mean that it contains accurate or complete information, especially for non-safety related
systems, since more focus is put on safety-related systems. Walkdowns are excellent tools to
confirm this information and to guarantee that the design is based on correct, not assumed data.
Plant or customer key stakeholders are project managers, engineers, or plant operations
and maintenance personnel familiar with the issue. Interviewing plant operations and
maintenance personnel can be beneficial to a project since these are the individuals interacting
with the systems every day. They typically understand how these systems and components work,
can identify the real issues they face, and can also provide feedback on realistic solutions to the
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problems. System and component engineers are another excellent source of information. These
engineers are in charge of the health of systems and major plant components and often perform
monitoring activities which can provide the backup data to support possible resolutions. Design
engineers, on the other hand, know how these issues relate to the plant’s design basis. Design
engineers are vital resources when identifying and updating impacted documents. All the
resources previously described can also assist in developing the background of the issue.
The definition of a project typically consists of the problem statement (i.e., what?),
background description (i.e., why?), and overall resolution of the problem (i.e., how?). This
definition should be a comprehensive description of the issue, the reason why it needs to be
solved, and how will it be solved. The background should also include reference to regulatory
requirements, system health issues, maintenance issues, or inspection findings that initiated the
change. The safety classification (i.e., non-nuclear safety related, safety-related, or
quality/augmented quality) of the project, or system/component, should also be described. The
project’s safety classification will give the reader or reviewer a sense of how complex the project
is. Non-nuclear safety-related projects are typically the less complex, while safety-related
projects are the most complex due to the amount of documentation and evaluations that need to
be performed to maintain the safety classification.
To assist reviewers, a detailed description of each engineering discipline’s (e.g.,
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, civil/structural engineering, and I&C
engineering) scope should also be incorporated. This section is typically completed by the
responsible engineer but should include input from resource engineers. In the case of our
simplified case study, this section can be described as follows:
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Mechanical Scope – Install a 6” drain line to the exiting FWT 8” spare drain
nozzle. A 6” gate valve and s threaded cap will also be installed. The line will be
2’ in length and will not require pipe stress analysis performed.



Electrical Scope – None. For the purposes of this simplified case, it will be
assumed that there are no electrical controls and no heat tracing required.



Civil/Structural scope – One (1) pipe support shall be installed on the new 6”
drain line.



I&C Scope – None.

The definition of a project is an essential part of any design change. This section may
also change during the life of the project; therefore, it should be revisited during every phase.
The scope also helps the responsible engineer and project manager on the identification of a
project team. In our case study, and for technical effort estimation purposes, the only resource
engineer involved will be a civil/structural engineer. For the remainder of this case study, all
activity person-hour estimates will be provided for the responsible engineer, who is also the
mechanical resource engineer, and a civil/structural engineer. In some cases, the responsible
engineer might not be a resource engineer. Therefore, person-hour estimates should consider
that. For efficiency purposes, it is preferred that the responsible engineer works in the discipline
of the most scope. For example, if most of the scope is mechanical, then it is preferred for the
responsible engineer to be a mechanical engineer. For simplicity, engineering supervision,
project management, and other overhead charges will be ignored when developing the estimate.
These charges are typically percentages of the direct engineering cost.
Since the overall scope of a plant modification is mainly developed during the initial
scoping phase, the effort to develop the technical portion is based on discussions held with plant
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personnel, walkdowns, and research of documents. A 20 person-hour estimate for defining the
project and 60 person-hours for walkdowns will be allocated. In realistic terms, 20 hours would
be enough to visit the site for a day, interview personnel, and type the information gathered. The
60-hour allocation for walkdowns will be used throughout the development of the conceptual
design, up until delivery of the package. Assuming 8 hour days, this translates to 7 to 8 days’
worth of walkdowns. The assistance of the resource engineer is also required, which would be a
portion of the hours assigned to the responsible engineer. In this case, approximately 25% of the
time would be assigned for project definition and walkdowns, which translates to 5 hours and 15
hours respectively. The estimates for person-hours and activity duration are shown in Table 2.

Person-Hour
Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

Define Project

20

5

1 week

Walkdowns

60

15

11 weeks

Activity

Table 2. Estimate for Project Definition and Walkdowns

4.2.4. Design Inputs
Design inputs are defined by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) as
the criteria, parameters, bases or other design requirements upon which detailed final design is
based (ASME, 1974). In other words, the design inputs are the researched information that will
be used to develop the design. The SDP procedure (i.e., IP-ENG-001), Attachment 10, provides a

68
guide to follow when evaluating design inputs. Nuclear power plants, as part of a design
process, might also have specific procedures in place that describe the process of gathering or
identifying design inputs. These procedures also serve as guides on what parameters to consider
and what forms or documents need to be completed. Some processes, such as the SDP, are
industry-wide and provide a standard guide that any plant can apply.
The SDP procedure provides a comprehensive list of thirty-three (33) design input
considerations. Some of these include:


Design conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature),



Codes and standards (e.g., ASME, Institute of Electrical Engineers and
Electronics (IEEE), American Welding Association (AWS), American Concrete
Institute (ACI)), and



Requirements (i.e., performance, materials, interface, loading, layout, operability,
redundancy, security, safety, failure, etc.).

The design inputs document for a plant modification is not a “once and done” document
or process. The design inputs document is a “living” document that will most likely be updated
during every phase of the project. Therefore, person-hour estimates should be allocated to this
activity at every phase of the project.
Since most of the research for a design occurs during the conceptual design phase, this
phase should include the biggest effort regarding person-hours to develop design inputs. By the
time the conceptual design is completed most of the design inputs should be identified and
confirmed by the customer. Further changes to design inputs occur due to scope changes or
interface changes that occur throughout the development of the design. Given that this case study
is based on a 12-week milestone with 11 weeks assigned to developing design inputs and
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assuming half of the engineer’s time will be spent in research, at least 120 hours should be
assigned to this effort. Again, 25% of that time will be assigned to the resource engineer. The
estimates for person-hours and activity duration are shown in Table 3.

Person-Hour
Activity
Design Inputs

Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

90

30

11 weeks

Table 3. Estimate for Design Inputs

4.2.5. Identify New and/or Update Affected Design Documents
Permanent modifications to nuclear power plants typically result in changes to the plant’s
design basis. Documents need to be created or updated to reflect the physical changes made to
the plant and to maintain the plant’s design basis current. Some of the documents that could be
created or modified are drawings, calculations, technical reports, specifications, procedures,
training materials, and design basis documents, among others. The identification, evaluation, and
initial updates to these documents can be used to define the scope of subsequent design phases,
such as the detailed design phase. The following sections describe the scope and processes of
updating these documents.
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4.2.6. Drawings
Drawings are graphical representations of the plant’s configuration or design. Based on
the scope of the hypothetical project used in this case study the scope of this portion would be:
1. Update the existing P&ID that currently shows the tank with a spare nozzle.
2. Create a new isometric drawing showing the new piping configuration.
3. Update existing FWT drawings, most likely a vendor drawing, to either add the
new piping or reference the new isometric drawing.
4. Update equipment drawings that potentially show the tanks spare nozzle.
5. Update any other drawings that use the P&ID as a base. Some of these could be
safe shutdown drawings or pipe stress analysis drawings.
6. Create a new drawing to show the design of the new pipe support.
The creation of a new isometric drawing will aid the engineer in the design and
constructability of the piping. Since this is a new drawing, it should be developed in some
Computer Aided Design (CAD) software such as AutoCAD or SolidWorks, among others.
Depending on the complexity of the design the support of a design technician could be needed
for this activity. For this case study, it is assumed that the principal and resource engineers are
both trained and skilled in CAD software and will be performing the drafting task. Having
engineers trained in the use of CAD software can save time and money in a project since it
removes one resource and allows the design to rely on the technical expert.
The update of existing drawings could be more complicated than creating new drawings.
Depending on the agreements reached with the customer updated drawings might consist of
markups of PDF (i.e., portable document format) type documents or updates to CAD drawings.
During the conceptual design phase it is essential to identify the following:
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1. Are impacted drawings available in CAD? What format or software?
2. If drawings are available in CAD format, would the customer prefer the
engineering company to update these or does the customer have the responsibility
to update them?
3. If drawings are not available in CAD format, are markups of PDF documents
acceptable to the customer? What information should those drawing markups
include?
The answers to these questions should be used as input when developing the subsequent phases
of the project. For a conceptual design, PDF copies of identified impacted drawings should be
obtained from the customer. Markups of these PDF documents should be included as part of
conceptual design package to serve as a demonstration of the conceptual design. Formal updates
to drawings should occur after the conceptual design is complete and accepted by the customer.
For the purpose of person-hour allocation, for the hypothetical scope, 40 hours will be
assigned to the development of a new piping isometric drawing, and 20 hours will be assigned to
the development of a new pipe support drawing. It will be assumed that four (4) additional
impacted drawings will need to be marked up. A total of 2 hours will be assigned to each
drawing. Regarding resources, the responsible engineer is in charge of creating the isometric
drawing and marking up impacted drawings. The resource engineer is responsible for creating
the new pipe support drawing. Peer reviews of each drawing will also need to be performed. Peer
reviews of each drawing are also needed at this stage. Peer reviewers provide a defense to detect
errors and defects before the completion of documents by reading and checking the quality of
another’s work product (INPO, 2005). At least 1 hour should be allocated for peer reviews. For
this case study, a total of 6 hours will be allocated for drawing peer reviews. This activity will be
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performed by additional resources, preferably one mechanical engineer for the mechanical
drawing and one civil/structural engineer for the civil/structural drawings. The estimates for
person-hours and activity duration are shown in Table 4.

Person-Hour
Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

New Drawings

40

20

2 weeks

Impacted Drawings

8

0

1 week

Drawing Peer Review

0

0

1 week

Activity

Table 4. Estimate for Drawings and Peer Reviews

Person-Hour
Activity

SME
(mechanical)

SME
(civil/structural)

Duration

New Drawings

0

0

2 weeks

Impacted Drawings

0

0

1 week

Drawing Peer Review

5

1

1 week

Table 4. Continued
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4.2.7. Calculations
Calculations are mathematical representations performed to show the results of an
analysis. Each nuclear power plant should have procedures that describe the process utilized
when performing calculations. In this case study, we can assume that two (2) calculations will be
needed, a hydraulic calculation and a pipe support calculation.
The hydraulic calculation determines the performance parameters of the new FWT drain
line. This calculation should demonstrate the total flow of water that could be achieved through
the new line. In the case where a line size is not provided as part of the overall scope of the
project and a total required flow is provided instead, this calculation would be used to determine
the size of the pipe required to fulfill the performance requirement. The pipe support calculation
determines the allowable loads for the designed support. This calculation also determines the
appropriate sizes of all individual members. Since these calculations will be performed under the
conceptual design phase, they will be considered preliminary calculations. Formal calculations
are completed in later design phases. The hydraulic calculation will be performed by a
mechanical engineer (or responsible engineer). The pipe support calculation will be performed
by a civil/structural engineer (or resource engineer). A peer review should also be conducted of
each calculation to ensure that the methods, assumptions, and results of the calculation are
correct. A total of 40 hours can be assigned to the development of each preliminary calculation.
Half of this total time, 20 hours, can be assigned to the peer review of the calculation. Assuming
the engineers will not be dedicated full time to this activity, a total of 2 weeks can be assigned to
the performance of these calculations, and one week can be designated for the peer review. The
estimates for person-hours and activity duration are shown in Table 5.
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Person-Hour
Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

Calculations

80

0

2 weeks

Calculation Peer
Review

0

0

1 week

Activity

Table 5. Estimate for Calculations

Person-Hour
Activity

SME
(mechanical)

SME
(civil/structural)

Duration

Calculations

0

0

2 weeks

Calculation Peer
Review

40

0

1 week

Table 5. Continued

4.2.8. Technical Reports
Technical reports are typically created to record engineering analyses or engineering
positions on a specific topic. Since the scope of this modification is simple and only adds a drain
line to FWT, no particular analyses or engineering positions are created from it. Therefore, for
this case study, it is assumed that no technical reports are created nor impacted by this
engineering change.
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4.2.9. Specifications
Specifications are documents that record detailed requirements or characteristics of a
system, structure, or component. Specifications can be of different types such as design,
procurement, fabrication, or material, among others. As an example, a procurement specification
would be required to purchase a safety-related valve to be installed in a radioactive controlled
area. This specification will include details in size, material, and performance requirements. For
this case study, since the new line is designated as non-nuclear safety related, the valve to be
installed will not have any “nuclear” specific requirements and will more than likely be an “off
the shelf” or “commercial grade” item. Therefore, no specification will be required. Details on
the valve, such as material and size, would be included in procurement documents. Some of
these documents could be requests for quotes or purchase orders.

4.2.10. Plant Operating Procedures
Procedures have for various purposes at nuclear power plants. Some procedures are used
for administrative purposes and only include descriptions of processes. Plant operating
procedures are used to perform work in the field. Typically nuclear power plants have designated
groups or departments that are responsible for updating plant operating procedures.
There are two (2) approaches to identify impacted procedures. One approach is for the
responsible engineer or resource engineers to identify the procedures by performing research.
Another method is to allow stakeholders or reviewers to identify impacted procedures within
their field of work during design package reviews. The second approach is the most efficient
since it will enable subject matter experts to identify the procedures and the appropriate impact.
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For this case study, it is assumed that at the time the project estimate is performed there
was no knowledge of impacted procedures. Therefore, hours should be allocated for the
responsible and resource engineers to perform research during the conceptual design phase to
identify the impacted procedures. At least 20 hours should be assigned to the responsible
engineer and 10 hours to the resource engineer to perform this task, with a one (1) week time
duration. The estimates for person-hours and activity duration are shown in Table 6.

Person-Hour
Activity
Identification of
Impacted Procedures

Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

20

10

1 week

Table 6. Estimate for Procedures

4.2.11. Training Materials
Training materials are typically those used to train nuclear power operators on the
maneuver of new systems or components. As with procedures, these training materials are
identified by stakeholders from the plant’s training department during design package reviews at
later design phases. Therefore, for this case study, no hours will be allocated to the identification
or update of training materials.
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4.2.12. Design Basis Documents
Design basis documents, or DBDs, are plant-specific documents that describe the highlevel functional requirements, interfaces, and expectations of a facility, structure, system or
component that are based on regulatory requirements or facility analyses (SDPSC, 2017). These
documents are an overall description and refer to other specific design documents such as
calculations and technical reports. DBDs are an excellent source of information on a particular
system and typically describe all the aspects of that system. Therefore, a scope such as the one
presented in this case study will impact a DBD. It is more than likely that the FWT, being a
major component or structure at a plant will be described on a DBD. The specific DBD will
differ from plant to plant. Specific changes to the DBD will also depend on how much detail the
plant includes in these documents. For this case study, hours should be allocated to identify
impacted DBDs (more than one could be impacted depending on how systems are set up) and to
detect potential changes to the DBD. Both the responsible and resource engineers will be
performing this activity. A total of at least 20 hours should be allocated to the responsible
engineer and 10 hours to the resource engineer. Time allotted should be around one week. The
estimates for person-hours and activity duration are shown in Table 7.

Person-Hour
Activity
Design Basis
Documents

Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

20

10

1 week

Table 7. Estimate for Design Basis Documents
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4.2.13. Installation Instructions
Even though the SDP does not consider detailed installation or testing instructions as
being part of the conceptual design phase, it is a good practice to start thinking about how the
design change will be implemented and tested, especially based on the phases of implementation.
This information can be added to plant specific forms or design package sections, or even to the
project scope if needed.
During the conceptual design phase, some important information to add is the materials
needed to implement the change. This list or bill of materials does not need to be detailed in this
phase. The list should provide reviewers an idea of the major equipment to be installed or
procurement long-lead components. For this case study, essential items to list are:
1. Pipe size, length, and material
2. Valve types, including vendor and models if available
3. Pipe support elements and construction materials, and
4. Fittings (e.g., flanges, gaskets, elbows, pipe caps).
If available at this stage, adding references to plant stock numbers is also helpful.
The materials needed for the design will be identified as the design is developed,
preferably after drawings are complete. Because of this, the duration of this activity should be
the duration of the project from the development of drawings to completion of conceptual design
phase (i.e., 8 weeks). For this case study, a total of 20 hours can be allocated to the responsible
engineer and 20 hours to the resource engineer. Both engineers, in this case, will be developing a
separate design, which is piping and pipe support. The estimates for person-hours and activity
duration are shown in Table 8.
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Person-Hour
Activity

Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

20

20

8 weeks

Bill of Materials

Table 8. Estimate for Bill of Materials

4.2.14. 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Review
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Chapter 10 (i.e., nuclear) of the code of federal
regulation (i.e., CFR), part 50.59, titled “Changes, Tests, and Experiments,” describes the
conditions by which a licensed nuclear power plant can make changes in the facility as described
in the final safety analysis report (as updated), make changes in the procedures as described in
the final safety analysis report (as updated), and conduct tests or experiments not described in the
final safety analysis report (as updated) without obtaining a license amendment (NRC, 2017) .
The NRC’s 10 CFR 72.48, titled “Changes, tests, and experiments,” describes the conditions by
which a licensee or certificate holder may make changes in the facility or spent fuel storage cask
design as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) (as updated), make changes in the
procedures as described in the SAR (as updated), and conduct tests or experiments not described
in the final safety analysis report (as updated), without obtaining a license amendment or a
Certificate of Compliance amendment submitted by the certificate holder. In other words, the
50.59 and 72.48 reviews are licensing reviews performed to ensure that the changes being made
to the plant are either covered under the current license or need further review by the NRC. For
the case study presented here, only the 50.59 applies since the design changes to be performed
only impact plant systems and do not impact the spent fuel storage cask.
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Power plants have specific procedures that need to be followed to perform these reviews.
The process is typically composed of three major parts. The first process is the applicability
determination (AD) which is the method for determining the appropriate regulatory processes
and reviews that are required for a proposed activity in accordance with utility-specific
procedures (SDPSC, 2017). The second process is the screening which determines if the
proposed change or activities have an adverse effect on SAR described safety functions. The
third, and last, process is the evaluation which determines if the proposed change or activity
needs approval from the NRC. Another licensing action that could be required is the update of
the Safety Analysis Report (SAR).
The SAR, or FSAR (i.e., Final Safety Analysis Report) as sometimes also called, is a
plant-specific document that shall include information that describes the facility, presents the
design bases and the limits on its operation, and presents a safety analysis of the structures,
systems, and components and of the facility as a whole (NRC, 2017). This document includes
information such as plant-specific location, results of environmental and meteorological
programs, descriptions and analyses of SSCs, kinds, and quantities of radioactive materials, and
facility operation, which includes organizational structure, the conduct of operations, and plans
for coping with emergencies, among others. Regarding systems, for small scopes as the one
presented in this case study, the descriptions provided in the SAR typically do not require
change. However, figures may require changes. In this case study, a P&ID which is also a SAR
figure is being updated. This change automatically warrants an amendment to the SAR which is
a separate process from the 50.59/72.48 and should be accounted for as an independent activity
within the project.
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During the conceptual design phase, per the SDP, preliminary or draft licensing
documents should be prepared. The AD is a document that is always required. The screen is
required if the AD determines it is. The same way, the evaluation is required if the screen
determines it is. Based on the scope provided for this case study, it is likely that only an AD will
be required. Also, since it was already identified that the impacted P&ID is also a SAR figure,
changes to the SAR will be required. Since the 50.59/72.48 review will require extensive
research of licensing documents (i.e., SAR, Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Operating
License), mainly by the responsible engineer, a total of 40 hours will be assigned to the
responsible engineer to perform this activity; 10 hours will be assigned to the resource engineer.
The activity should be performed in a 2-week timeframe. Since changes to the SAR are required,
and it is known that the change only involves updating a figure or drawing, a total of 5 hours will
be assigned to the responsible engineer, with a duration of 1 week. There is no need to allocate
hours to the resource engineer for this activity. The estimates for person-hours and activity
duration are shown in Table 9.

Person-Hour
Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

50.59/72.48 Review

40

10

2 week

SAR Update

5

0

1 week

Activity

Table 9. Estimate for 50.59/72.48 Review

82
4.2.15. Programs Impact Review
The review of engineering programs to incorporate any design change impact is included
in the SDP Design Attribute Review (DAR). The DAR is a review performed during
development of an Engineering Change to determine applicable or impacted engineering
disciplines, engineering programs and stakeholders from other departments, areas or programs
(SDPSC, 2017). For this case study, the first part of the DAR was performed in the scope
definition when the engineering disciplines were identified. This section focuses on the second
portion of the DAR, Engineering Topics/Programs.
A list of engineering topics and programs that could be impacted by a design change is
shown in Attachment 10 of the SDP (SDPSC, 2017). Some of these include:


Environmental Qualification (EQ),



Fire Protection, Appendix R, and NFPA 0805 (i.e., National Fire Protection
Association),



FLEX (i.e., post-Fukushima strategies),



License Renewal and Aging Management,



Maintenance Rule, and



MOVs (i.e., motor operated valves), AOVs (i.e., air operated valves), Relief
Valves, and Check Valves.

Another list of engineering programs can also be found in INPO’s document 15-003, “Conduct
of Engineering Programs at Nuclear Power Stations.” INPO’s document includes a description of
each program, what caused the program to be created, and the key aspects monitored under the
program.

83
During the conceptual design phase, a preliminary review of programs should be
performed. The process to conduct this review should be part of a plant-specific procedure.
Usually, forms are provided and should be filled as part of the design change package. For this
case study, a total of 30 hours will be allocated to this activity for the responsible engineer. The
impacted programs should be identified by the end of the conceptual design phase. At least two
weeks should be assigned as the duration time of this activity. Assistance from the resource
engineer might be needed but are not being assumed in this case study. The estimates for personhours and activity duration are shown in Table 10.

Person-Hour
Activity
Programs Impact
Review

Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

30

0

2 weeks

Table 10. Estimate for Programs Impact Review

4.2.16. Design Reviews
This portion of the process involves two main activities: internal review of the conceptual
design by each engineering discipline’s SME and stakeholder review by plant personnel. Since
the engineers working on this conceptual design are external to the plant, a design review should
be performed by SME’s from the same company or firm as the engineers. This review will
ensure that the conceptual design is technically correct before presenting it to the customer.
During other design phases, verification will be needed. The difference between review and
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verification is that a review can be performed by individuals that are familiar with the design
while a verification is performed by individuals completely independent from the design. For this
case study, 20 hours will be allocated to the mechanical review and 10 hours to the
civil/structural review, with one-week duration. The estimates for person-hours and activity
duration are shown in Table 11.

Person-Hour
Activity

SME
(mechanical)

SME
(civil/structural)

Duration

20

10

1 week

SME Internal Review

Table 11. Estimate for SME Internal Review

4.2.17. Estimates for Next Phases
By the end of the conceptual design phase the responsible and resource engineers should
be familiar with the scope of the project and the impact the design change will have on plant
documents and processes. Therefore, this is the best time to develop person-hour estimates for
the technical portion of the remaining phases of the project. These estimates might also be
required by the plant to approve the project to continue to the next stage. Given the scope
presented for this case study, 20 hours could be assigned to the responsible engineer to develop
the estimate. Ten total hours should also be allocated for the resource engineer to support the
responsible engineer with one-week duration. The estimates for person-hours and activity
duration are shown in Table 12.
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Person-Hour
Activity
Next Phase Estimate

Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

20

10

1 week

Table 12. Estimate for Next Design Phase

4.2.18. Conceptual Impact Review Meeting
A conceptual design meeting should be held after the conceptual design package has been
issued to the plant. The purpose of this meeting is to present the conceptual design to different
plant departments, answer questions from stakeholders, and to obtain feedback on the design. In
some plants, the conceptual design meeting is also a platform for plant management to decide if
the design should continue to the next phases and to approve the budget to do so. Per the SDP,
the design package should be submitted to stakeholders at least one week before the meeting. For
estimations purposes, hours should be allocated for the engineers to develop a presentation for
this meeting and to attend the meeting. Because of this, 15 hours will be allocated for the
responsible engineer, and 5 hours will be allocated for the resource engineer’s assistance. It is a
good practice for all engineering disciplines involved with the design to be present at the meeting
since technical questions may arise that cannot be answered by the responsible engineer alone.
The estimates for person-hours and activity duration are shown in Table 13.
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Person-Hour
Activity

Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

Duration

15

5

1 week

Conceptual Design
Meeting

Table 13. Estimate for Conceptual Design Meeting

4.2.19. Conceptual Design Estimate
The totals for the conceptual design estimates are shown in Table 14. As mentioned
previously, these estimates are for the technical portion of the project and should be an input to
the development of offer letters and project schedules, which are outside of the scope of
engineering.
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Person-Hour
Responsible
Engineer
(mechanical)

Resource
Engineer
(civil/structural)

SME
(mechanical)

SME
(civil/structural)

Duration

Define Project

20

5

0

0

1 week

Walkdowns

60

15

0

0

11 weeks

Design Inputs

90

30

0

0

11 weeks

New Drawings

40

20

0

0

2 weeks

Impacted Drawings

8

0

0

0

1 week

Drawing Peer
Review

0

0

5

1

1 week

Calculations

80

0

0

0

2 weeks

Calculation Peer
Review

0

0

40

0

1 week

Identification of
Impacted
Procedures

20

10

0

0

1 week

Design Basis
Documents

20

10

0

0

1 week

Bill of Materials

20

20

0

0

8 weeks

50.59/72.48 Review

40

10

0

0

2 week

SAR Update

5

0

0

0

1 week

Programs Impact
Review

30

0

0

0

2 weeks

SME Internal
Review

0

0

20

10

1 week

Next Phase Estimate

20

10

0

0

1 week

Conceptual Design
Meeting

15

5

0

0

1 week

468

135

65

11

= 679 hours

Activity

TOTAL

Table 14. Complete Estimate for Conceptual Design Phase
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4.2.20. Conceptual Design Schedule
The activities and estimates presented in this section can be captured in a schedule as
shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. This schedule serves as an input to the project’s overall
schedule which should be created and maintained by the project manager. The estimate only
addresses technical activities. Management or financial activities are not covered under this
estimate. The description of activities and estimates provided in this section will be used to
identify project risks and possible mitigation methods which are shown in the next section.
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Figure 21. Conceptual Design Schedule – Task, Duration, Resources, and Budget Hours
(Microsoft Project)
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Figure 22. Conceptual Design Schedule – Timeline (Microsoft Project)
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4.3. Part III: Risks
Risk, by definition, is the product of the likelihood and consequence associated with an
adverse outcome (INPO, 2015). Project risks can often be identified, and mitigation strategies
can be put in place to avoid delays in schedule and increases in cost. There are various tools used
in the industry to identify risks. Some of the most common tools are Preliminary Hazard
Analysis (PHA), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Job Safety Analysis (JSA), Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Cause and Consequences
Analysis (CCA), among others. These tools’ purpose is to identify failure modes, or risks, and to
find ways to mitigate their effects.
This case study applies the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) tool to identify
risks that can arise during the development of the conceptual design discussed in Section 4.2. An
FMEA is an engineering analysis done by a cross-functional team of subject matter experts that
thoroughly analyzes product designs or manufacturing processes, early in the product
development process (Carlson, 2014). Each of the activities included in the conceptual design
estimate and schedule from Section 4.2 is evaluated to identify potential failure modes,
determine potential effects of failure, assign severity rating, identify potential causes of failure,
assign occurrence rating, identify design controls to prevent and detect the failure, and assign
detection rating. A risk priority number (RPN) is then calculated for each activity. The RPN is a
numerical ranking of the risk of each potential failure mode/cause, made up of the arithmetic
product of the three elements: severity of the effect, the likelihood of occurrence of the cause,
and the likelihood of detection of the cause (Carlson, 2014). The RPN number is then used to
create graphical representations of potential failure modes for each activity. The purpose of these
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graphs is to draw attention to the most significant failure modes within each activity.
Recommendations on how to mitigate the risks are also provided.
In his 2014 paper, Carlson provides generic FMEA worksheets, severity scales,
likelihood scales, and occurrence scales. Adapted versions of these are used in this case study.
Instead of evaluating effects such as safety and regulatory requirements, the severity scale used
for this case study assesses the impact on rework and safety or operability issues. The scale is
ranked from “No Effect” to “Safety or Operability Issue” and is based on the effects the failure
would have on the person-hour effort, schedule, deliverables, outage, and even plant shutdown.
The likelihood of failure (i.e., occurrence) scale based on the experience the responsible and
resource engineers have with nuclear power and the engineering design process and how that
experience can help reduce the likelihood of the activity failures to occur, instead of identifying
incidents per item. The occurrence scale is ranked from “Very Low” to “Very High” likelihood
of failure. Instead of focusing on stages of detection, the detection scale is also based on
engineers’ experience to detect issues. The scale is ranked from “Almost Certain” to “Absolute
Uncertainty” of detecting issues before reaching the customer. The controls element of the
FMEA is replaced by human performance (HU) tools that can be applied to prevent or detect the
failure mode. These tools can be found in INPO’s report number 05-002 (INPO, 2007), “Human
Performance Tools for Engineers and Other Knowledge Workers.”
The use of the FMEA tool to manage project risks relates to INPO’s Principles for
Excellence in Integrated Risk Management as follows:


Principle #1 – Corporate and nuclear leaders foster a culture that promotes risk
awareness and effective risk management (INPO, 2015). Leaders can foster a
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culture of risk awareness by encouraging the use of risk assessment tools such as
FMEA.


Principle #2 – Individuals take responsibility for identifying and managing the
risk inherent in their activities and demonstrate a personal commitment to nuclear
safety (INPO, 2015). This principle is fulfilled by identifying potential failure
modes for activities performed throughout the project’s life.



Principle #3 – High standards of risk recognition, management, and mitigation are
embedded in corporate and station policies, programs and processes (INPO,
2015). The identification of potential effects of failure, potential causes of failure,
and current design controls to prevent and detect failure describes the core of this
principle.



Principle #4 – A consequence-biased approach is applied to risk determination,
and decision-making reflects an intolerance for unacceptable end states (INPO,
2015). The calculation of the RPN can help individuals distinguish acceptable
from unacceptable risks.



Principle #5 – Risk is eliminated or minimized through pre-emptive actions based
on a well-defined understanding of event significance and consequence. Residual
risk is mitigated to acceptable levels using compensatory measures (INPO, 2015).
The development of FMEA recommended actions and RPN describe this
principle.



Principle #6 – Leaders and individuals communicate risk effectively among the
nuclear division, corporate executives and other key stakeholders, including the
board of directors (INPO, 2015). After an FMEA is performed for a project, the
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results of such analysis should be communicated to team members to create an
awareness of potential risks and to provide possible mitigation techniques.


Principle #7 – Periodic effectiveness reviews are performed to promote
continuous learning and to improve risk management across the organization
(INPO, 2015). These are translated into the various reviews performed throughout
the project and stem from peer reviews of individual deliverables to the internal
review of the design package.

The accurate application of these principles to the development of a project could
guarantee excellence, thus contributing to the Delivering the Nuclear Promise initiative within
the nuclear industry.

4.3.1. FMEA Severity Scale
The severity scale used for this case study is based on the amount of effort that the
activity’s failure mode could potentially add to the project. The scale is divided into three main
categories: “Safety or Operability Issue,” “Rework,” and “No Effect.” The “No Effect,” lowest
ranking category, is based on the failure not affecting project schedule or deliverables. “Safety or
Operability Issue,” the highest category, is based on the activity failure’ potential to introduce a
new safety hazard at the plant or to create an operability issue which could lead to a plant
shutdown. The “Rework” category is divided into eight (8) different ranks. These differentiate
the effort, in time, needed to recuperate from the error and the effect it will have on the project
schedule, deliverables, installation, and outage schedule. The generated severity scale is shown
in Table 15.
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Category
Safety or
Operability Issue

Rework

No Effect

Criteria

Rank

Creates a new safety hazard or plant operability
issue (i.e., leading to plant shutdown)

10

Significate effort; could impact implementation
and/or outage schedule

9

More than 1 month effort; may have some impact
on implementation and/or outage schedule

8

More than 1 month effort; has some impact on
schedule and may impact deliverables

7

More than 2 week effort but less than 1 month; has
some impact on schedule and may impact
deliverables

6

More than 1 week effort but less than 2 weeks; has
some impact on schedule but not on deliverables

5

More than 1 day effort but less than 1 week; has
some impact on schedule but not on deliverables

4

More than 1 hour effort but less than 1 day; has no
impact on schedule nor deliverables

3

Less than 1 hour effort; has no impact on schedule
nor deliverables

2

None

1
Table 15. FMEA Severity Scale
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4.3.2. FMEA Likelihood of Failure Scale
The likelihood of failure scale used for this case study is based on the experience the
responsible and resource engineers have with nuclear power and the engineering design process
and how that experience can help reduce the likelihood of the activity failures to occur. The scale
is divided into five (5) categories ranging from “Very Low” likelihood of failure to “Very High”
likelihood of failure. The “Very Low” likelihood of failure corresponds to engineers having 10
or more years of experience within the nuclear power industry and having extensive experience
with engineering modification projects. The “Very High” likelihood of failure corresponds to
engineers having less than one year of experience within the nuclear power industry and
engineering modification projects. Ranks were assigned to each category and range from 1
(“Very Low”) to 5 (“Very High”). The categories in between are focused on experience and
capability of the resource engineers. The likelihood of failure scale is shown in Table 16.
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Likelihood of
Failure

Criteria

Rank

Very High

Responsible and resource engineers are new (i.e.,
1 year or less) within the nuclear power industry
and to engineering modification projects.

5

4

High

Responsible and/or resource engineers are
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the
nuclear power industry, but have no experience
engineering modification projects.

3

Moderate

Responsible and resource engineers are somewhat
experienced (i.e., five to ten years) within the
nuclear power industry with at least half of their
experience focused in engineering modification
projects.

Low

Responsible and resource engineers are
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the
nuclear power industry with at least half of their
experience focused in engineering modification
projects.

2

Very Low

Responsible and resource engineers are
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the
nuclear power industry and have extensive
experience with engineering modification projects.

1

Table 16. FMEA Likelihood of Failure Scale
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4.3.3. FMEA Opportunity for Detection Scale
Similar to the likelihood of failure scale, the opportunity for detection scale used for this
case study is based on the experience the responsible and resource engineers have with nuclear
power and the engineering design process. The scale focuses on how the engineers’ expertise can
help in the detection of failures within the activities before the failures reach or affect the
customer. The scale is divided into seven (7) categories ranging from “Almost Certain”
likelihood of failure to “Absolute Uncertainty” when it comes to opportunities for detecting
failures. Ranks were assigned to each category and range from 1 (“Almost Certain” – failure is
likely to be detected) to 7 (“Absolute Uncertainty” – failure cannot be detected). The categories
in between are focused on experience and capability of the resource engineers, similar to the
likelihood scale. The generated opportunity for detection scale is shown in Table 17.

99
Opportunity for
Detection (before
reaching customer)

Criteria

Rank

Absolute
Uncertainty

No controls are in place to detect failure.
Failure cannot be detected.

7
6

Very Low

Responsible and resource engineers are new
(i.e., 1 year or less) within the nuclear power
industry and to engineering modification
projects.

5

Low

Responsible and/or resource engineers are
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the
nuclear power industry, but have no experience
engineering modification projects.

4

Medium

Responsible and resource engineers are
somewhat experienced (i.e., five to ten years)
within the nuclear power industry with at least
half of their experience focused in engineering
modification projects.

3

High

Responsible and resource engineers are
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the
nuclear power industry with at least half of their
experience focused in engineering modification
projects.

2

Very High

Responsible and resource engineers are
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the
nuclear power industry and have extensive
experience with engineering modification
projects.

Almost Certain

Controls are in place to detect failure.

1

Table 17. FMEA Opportunity for Detection Scale
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4.3.4. Resources
The resources for this case study, as described in Section 4.2, are the principal engineer,
resource engineer and subject matter experts (SMEs). For this FMEA the following experience
will be taken into consideration when evaluating the activities:


Principal engineer – A Mechanical engineer with more than ten (10) years in the nuclear
industry and approximately six (6) years of engineering design experience.



Resource engineer – Civil/structural engineer with more than twelve (12) years of
experience in the nuclear industry and approximately four years of engineering design
experience.



SME – The SMEs are mechanical and civil/structural engineers with more than 15 years
of experience in the nuclear industry and with more than ten (10) years of engineering
design experience.

These descriptions will be applied when evaluating the likelihood of failure and opportunity for
detection for each activity. Most of the activities evaluated next are performed by the responsible
engineer or by resource engineers. These engineers are experienced (i.e., 10 or more years)
within the nuclear power industry with at least half of their experience focused on engineering
modification projects. Therefore, an occurrence rating of 2 and detection rating of 3 is assigned
to each of these activities.

101
4.3.5. FMEA for Define Project
The definition of the project could be the most important activity in the development of a
design. This activity defines the entire project. Two failure modes were identified for this
activity. These are:


FM.1.1 – Project not correctly defined



FM.1.2 – Not all pertinent information received from the customer

Table 18 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. As shown in the table, the
identified failure modes can cause significant issues with schedule and deliverables. Changes in
scope, especially late during the design, could lead to delays in implementation or even on
outage schedule. The responsible and resource engineers perform this activity. The severity,
occurrence, and detection ranking numbers are shown in Table 19 and Figure 23. The FMEA
table shows FM.1.2, not all pertinent information received from the customer, as being the most
significant issue that could affect this activity.
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Function/
Process

Define
Project

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential
Effects of
Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

FM.1.1

Changes in the
project scope
will occur
which can
impact cost and
schedule

Information
missed during
customer
meetings

Customer
dissatisfaction

Walkdowns
not
performed

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
Technical
Task Prejob
Briefing
SelfChecking

Recommended
Action(s)

Maintain constant
communication with
the customer,
specifically with
customer SMEs.

Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions

FM.1.2

Changes in the
project scope
will occur
which can
impact cost and
schedule

Customer did
not have a
clear
requirement
when the
project was
assigned

Technical
Task Prejob
Briefing

New
requirements
were created
during the
development
of the design

Validate
Assumptions

Questioning
Attitude

Maintain constant
communication with
the customer,
specifically with
customer SMEs.
Research of OE can
help the customer
identify issues that were
not considered.

Table 18. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Define Project

Function/
Process
Define
Project

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

FM.1.1

7

2

3

42

FM.1.2

9

2

3

54

Table 19. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Define Project
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10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Severity (S)

Occurrence (L)
FM.1.1

Detection (D)

FM.1.2

Figure 23. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Define Project
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4.3.6. FMEA for Walkdowns
As described in Section 4.2.3, walkdowns should be performed pre-design and during the
development of the design. Three failure modes were identified for this activity. These are:


FM.2.1 – Wrong system/component was observed;



FM.2.2 – Area cannot be accessed;



FM.2.3 – Correct tools (i.e., camera, tape measurer, etc.) are not available.

Table 20 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU tools
identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.
The most severe of the failure modes is FM.2.1. If the wrong system or component is
observed during a walkdown, this could lead to future changes in design that were not accounted
for, which could at the same time impact schedule and deliverables. The responsible and
resource engineers perform walkdowns. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the
failure modes identified are shown in Table 21 and Figure 24. The FMEA table shows FM.2.1,
wrong system/component, was observed as being the most significant issue that could affect this
activity.
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects of
Failure

Walkdowns

FM.2.1

Changes in design
could occur which
could also impact
cost and schedule

FM.2.2

FM.2.3

Assumptions
would be put in
place that would
need validation in
the future

More walkdowns
may be required

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Incorrect
interpretation
of drawings
Information
obtained from
sources not
familiar with
the system/
component
Work planned
by others
Walkdown
scheduled
without
consulting
correct
stakeholders
Engineers are
not prepared to
perform the
walddown

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
Technical
Task Prejob
Briefing

Recommended
Action(s)

Include customer
SMEs to
walkdown plans.

SelfChecking
Questioning
Attitude
SelfChecking
Validate
Assumptions
Project
Planning
Technical
Task Prejob
Briefing

Coordinate
walkdowns with
the customer.
Involvement of
customer SMEs
could help
engineers identify
any issues with
accessing areas of
the plant.
Engineers should
ensure that tools
are available for
walkdowns. Prejob briefs can help
identify any issues
with obtaining the
necessary tools.

Table 20. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Walkdowns

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

Walkdowns

FM.2.1

7

2

3

42

FM.2.2

5

2

3

30

FM.2.3

4

2

3

24

Table 21. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Walkdowns
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FM.2.1
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Detection (D)

FM.2.3

Figure 24. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Walkdowns
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4.3.7. FMEA for Design Inputs
During the conceptual design phase, the identification of design inputs is an essential
task since it will determine how the design will progress. If some design inputs are not
considered during this phase or are incorrectly identified, this could lead to severe effects. One
failure mode was identified for this activity. This is:


FM.3.1 – Design inputs not considered or incorrectly identified

Table 22 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. This failure mode could cause
significant rework that could lead to changes in schedule and deliverables, especially since there
is a potential for some of the work for future phases not to have been estimated. The responsible
and resource engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection rankings for
the failure modes identified are shown in Table 23 and Figure 25.

Function/
Process

Design
Inputs

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects of
Failure

FM.3.1

Design parameters
are not
incorporated into
design (e.g.,
dimensions)
Incorrect materials
specified
Impacted
documents not
identified
Incorrect
estimation of effort
for future phases

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Improper
review of
existing
documents
related to the
system or
component

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
SelfChecking
Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions

Recommended
Action(s)

Ensure the proper
reviews are being
performed by
knowledgeable
SMEs.
Consultation with
customer SMEs
may also be
beneficial.

Peer Review

Table 22. Failure Modes, Effects, and Causes, and Recommendations – Design Inputs
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Function/
Process
Design
Inputs

Potential
Failure
Modes
FM.3.1

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

7

2

3

42

Table 23. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Inputs
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Detection (D)
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Figure 25. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Inputs
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4.3.8. FMEA for New Drawings
Two failure modes were identified for the identification and creation of new drawings
activity. These are:


FM.4.1 – Not all new drawings are identified;



FM.4.2 – Drawing does not capture the scope.

Table 24 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. Recognizing the need to create
new drawings during the conceptual design phase is essential since it will determine the amount
of effort for the next design phases. Even though it best to identify these drawings early in the
design, it is not imperative to initiate all drawings during the conceptual design phase. The effort
to recuperate from an error like this could be as easy as listing the drawing within the package.
This effort can be minimal as long as it is caught during the conceptual design. If drawings do
not capture the scope correctly, even though it is significant, the effort to correct this failure can
be easily detected by knowledgeable reviewers. These drawings should be updated as soon as
possible and before they are presented to the customer.
All of the identified failure effects could cause rework that could lead to changes in
schedule and deliverables, especially since there is a potential for some of the work for future
phases not to have been estimated. The responsible and resource engineers perform this activity.
The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in
Table 25 and Figure 26. The FMEA table shows FM.4.1, though not all new drawings are
identified, as being the most significant issue that could affect this activity.
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Function/
Process

New
Drawings

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects of
Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

FM.4.1

New drawings will
need to be
developed during
future design
phases

Engineers are
not familiar
with the
plant’s
drawings
system

Effort to develop
new drawings may
not be accounted
for during
estimation
FM.4.2

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
SelfChecking
Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions

Recommended
Action(s)

Ensure engineers
and SME reviewers
are familiar with
the scope of the
project and the
specific plant
processes for
drawings.

Peer Review

Rework to update
drawings during
future phases

Engineers are
not familiar
with the scope

Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions

Ensure engineers
have a thorough
understanding of
the project’s scope
and how it should
be captured in
drawings,
specifically
following plant
requirements.

Table 24. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – New Drawings

Function/
Process
New
Drawings

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

FM.4.1

3

2

3

18

FM.4.2

6

2

3

36

Table 25. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Inputs
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FM.4.1

Detection (D)

FM.4.2

Figure 26. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – New Drawings
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4.3.9. FMEA for Impacted Drawings
Similar to the development of new drawings, two failure modes were identified for this
activity. These are:


FM.5.1 – Not all impacted drawings are identified;



FM.5.2 – Drawing does not capture the scope.

Table 26 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The severity of the failure
modes identified for this activity is lower than the creation of new drawings since it is not vital to
identify all impacted drawings during the conceptual design phase, which can be a preliminary
design. The effort to recuperate from an error like this could be as easy as listing the drawing
within the package. The responsible and resource engineers perform this activity. The severity,
occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in Table 26 and
Figure 27. The FMEA table shows FM.5.2 as being the most significant issue that could affect
this activity.
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Function/
Process

Impacted
Drawings

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects of
Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

FM.5.1

Impacted drawings
will need to be
identified during
future design
phases

Engineers are
not familiar
with plant’s
drawings
system

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
SelfChecking
Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions

Recommended
Action(s)

Ensure engineers
and SME reviewers
are familiar with
the scope of the
project and the
specific plant
processes for
drawings.

Peer Review
FM.5.2

Rework to update
drawings during
future phases

Engineers are
not familiar
with plant’s
drawings
system

Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions

Ensure the effort is
accounted for in
estimates to
identify impacted
drawings in future
design phases.

Table 26. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Impacted Drawings

Function/
Process
Impacted
Drawings

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

FM.5.1

2

2

3

12

FM.5.2

2

2

3

30

Table 27. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Impacted Drawings
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Figure 27. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Impacted Drawings
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4.3.10. FMEA for Drawing Peer Review
This activity involves the peer review of new and impacted drawings and is performed by
knowledgeable SMEs. More than one SME might be required depending on the discipline of
each drawing. Three failure modes were identified for this activity. These are:


FM.6.1 – Review did not catch evident errors;



FM.6.2 – Reviewer is not the proper SME;



FM.6.3 – Reviewer is not qualified to review drawings.

Table 28 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. As stated in Section 4.2, this
activity is performed by the knowledgeable SMEs. The SMEs in this case study are experienced
(i.e., 10 or more years) within the nuclear power industry with extensive experience focused on
engineering modification projects. Therefore, an occurrence rating of 1 and detection rating of 2
is assigned. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure modes identified are
shown in Table 29 and Figure 28. The FMEA table shows FM.6.1 as being the most significant
issue that could affect this activity.
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Drawing
Peer Review

FM.6.1

Potential Effects of
Failure

Drawing is issued
to the customer
with errors

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Reviewer was
not familiar
with the scope
of the project
Reviewer did
not take the
time to
perform a
thorough
review

FM.6.2

FM.6.3

Errors in drawing
can be missed

Drawing review
might not fulfil
customer’s
requirements

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions
Peer Review

Qualified
resources may
not have been
available to
perform the
review

Questioning
Attitude

Qualified
resources may
not have been
available to
perform the
review

Questioning
Attitude

Project
Planning

Validate
Assumptions

Recommended
Action(s)

Ensure reviewers
are assigned early
in the process to
ensure they are
available when
needed and that
proper time is
allotted for their
review.
Individuals should
ensure they are
knowledgeable on
a topic before
accepting to
perform work.
Always ensure
assigned reviewers
are qualified to the
process they are
reviewing under.

Peer Review

Table 28. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations –Drawings Peer Review

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

Drawing
Peer Review

FM.6.1

6

1

2

12

FM.6.2

5

1

2

10

FM.6.3

4

1

2

8

Table 29. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Drawings Peer Review
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Figure 28. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Drawings Peer Review
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4.3.11. FMEA for Calculations
Calculations are a vital part of any design. They typically justify a design using
mathematical evaluations. Calculations can be as simple as calculating the flow through a short
piece of pipe or as complicated as generating a pipe stress analysis of an entire piping
arrangement. Due to the amount of effort it takes to complete a calculation (i.e., develop
technical content, reviews, verifications, etc.) errors such as not identifying impacted
calculations or not using correct methods can result in adverse effects for a project. Four failure
modes were identified for this activity. These are:


FM.7.1 – Wrong design inputs were considered;



FM.7.2 – Impacted calculations were not identified;



FM.7.3 – Calculation method is not appropriate;



FM.7.4 – Originator is not qualified to perform the calculation.

Table 30 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure
modes identified are shown in Table 31 and Figure 29. The FMEA table shows FM.7.2 as being
the most significant issue that could affect this activity.
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects of
Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

Calculations

FM.7.1

Calculation results
may not be
accurate

Improper
review of
existing
documents
related to the
system or
component

Questioning
Attitude

Engineers are
not familiar
with the
plant’s
calculation
system

Questioning
Attitude

FM.7.2

Effort to develop
calculations during
next design phases
may not have been
estimated.

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)

Validate
Assumptions

FM.7.4

Calculation may
not be accepted by
the customer

Calculation might
not fulfil
customer’s
requirements

Communication
with customer’s
SME could help
identify design
inputs.

ProblemSolving

Validate
Assumptions
ProblemSolving

FM.7.3

Recommended
Action(s)

Engineers are
not familiar
with the
plant’s
calculation
process or
with the topic

Questioning
Attitude

Qualified
resources may
not have been
available to
perform the
calculation

Questioning
Attitude

Validate
Assumptions

Communication
with customer’s
SME could help
identify other
potential
impacted
calculations.
Discussions with
SME’s and
review of OE can
help identify
appropriate
methods.

ProblemSolving

Validate
Assumptions
ProblemSolving

Always ensure
the assigned
originators are
qualified to the
plant’s
calculation
process.

Table 30. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Calculations
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

Calculations

FM.7.1

6

2

3

36

FM.7.2

9

2

3

54

FM.7.3

8

2

3

48

FM.7.4

6

2

3

36

Table 31. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculations
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Figure 29. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculations
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4.3.12. FMEA for Calculation Peer Review
At the conceptual design phase not correctly reviewing or verifying a calculation could
impact future design phases. At this stage, the impact is not as severe as the creation of new
calculations since the review/verification is not final. Final reviews and/or verifications are
performed after the final design is complete. Three failure modes were identified for this activity.
These are:


FM.8.1 – Verification did not catch evident errors;



FM.8.2 – Verifier is not the proper SME;



FM.8.3 – Verifier is not qualified to review calculations.

Table 32 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. SMEs perform this activity.
The SMEs in this case study are experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the nuclear power
industry with extensive experience focused on engineering modification projects. Therefore, an
occurrence rating of 1 and detection rating of 3 is assigned. The severity, occurrence, and
detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in Table 33 and Figure 30. The
FMEA table shows FM.8.1 as being the most significant issue that could affect this activity.
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Calculation
Peer
Review

FM.8.1

FM.8.2

FM.8.3

Potential Effects of
Failure

Calculation is
issued to the
customer with
errors

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Verifier was
not familiar
with the
scope of the
project

Errors in the
calculation can be
missed

Calculation review
might not fulfil
customer’s
requirements

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
Peer Review
Questioning
Attitude

Verifier did
not take the
time to
perform a
thorough
verification

Technical
Task Prejob
Briefing

Qualified
resources
may have not
been
available to
perform the
verification

Project
Planning

Qualified
resources
may have not
been
available to
perform the
verification

Project
Planning

Questioning
Attitude

Questioning
Attitude

Recommended
Action(s)

A peer review
performed by
another resource
may be beneficial
in identifying
errors.

Individuals
should ensure
they are
knowledgeable on
a topic before
accepting to
perform work.
Always ensure
assigned verifiers
are qualified to
the process they
are verifying
under.

Table 32. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Calculation Peer Review

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

Calculation
Peer Review

FM.8.1

7

1

3

21

FM.8.2

6

1

3

18

FM.8.3

5

1

3

15

Table 33. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculation Peer Review
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Figure 30. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculation Peer Review
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4.3.13. FMEA for Identification of Impacted Procedures
Plant operating procedures impacted by a design change can be identified during different
phases of a project, especially during plant stakeholder reviews. These procedures are updated
after, or right before, a new design is implemented. Non-engineers typically perform the update
or creation of procedures. Only one failure mode was identified for this activity:


FM.9.1 – Not all impacted procedures are identified.

Table 34 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure
modes identified are shown in Table 35 and Figure 31.

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Identification
of Impacted
Procedures

FM.9.1

Potential Effects
of Failure

Not all
procedures are
updated with
current plant
design.

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
A
comprehensive
review of
potentially
impacted
procedures
was not
performed by
the engineers.

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
Questioning
Attitude
SelfChecking

Recommended
Action(s)

Always ensure
that the resource
engineers provide
support in
identifying
affected
documents.

Table 34. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Identification of Impacted
Procedures
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

Identification
of Impacted
Procedures

FM.9.1

4

2

3

24

Table 35. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Identification of Impacted Procedures
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Figure 31. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Identification of Impacted Procedures
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4.3.14. FMEA for Design Basis Documents
Similar to the identification of impacted procedures, the identification of design basis
documents can be identified during different phases of a project. These documents are updated
outside of the design process. Markups are typically included in design packages for information
only. Only one failure mode was identified for this activity:


FM.10.1 – Not all impacted DBDs are identified.

Table 36 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure
modes identified are shown in Table 37 and Figure 32.

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects
of Failure

Design Basis
Documents

FM.10.1

DBDs are not
updated with
current plant
design.

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
A
comprehensive
review of
existing DBDs
was not
performed by
the engineers.

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
Questioning
Attitude
SelfChecking

Recommended
Action(s)

Always ensure
that the resource
engineers provide
support in
identifying
affected
documents.

Table 36. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Design Basis Documents
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

Design
Basis
Documents

FM.10.1

4

2

3

24

Table 37. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Basis Documents
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Figure 32. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Basis Documents
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4.3.15. FMEA for Bill of Materials
During the conceptual design phase, a preliminary bill of materials (BOM) is developed
based on the initial design. This list gets refined as the design progresses. A final or complete
BOM is generated after the final design is complete. Because of this, not identifying all items in
a BOM, or having errors, will more than likely not have a significant effect on a project. Three
failure modes were identified for this activity. These are:


FM.11.1 – Not all materials were added to the BOM;



FM.11.2 – Items identified cannot be purchased or do not exist;



FM.11.3 – Customer does not agree on materials chosen.

Table 38 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure
modes identified are shown in Table 39 and Figure 33. The FMEA table shows FM.11.3 as being
the most significant issue that could affect this activity.
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Function/
Process

Bill of
Materials

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects
of Failure

FM.11.1

None. The design
is conceptual. The
list will be refined
in the next design
phase.

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure
Design is
preliminary

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions

Recommended
Action(s)

Include as many
materials as
possible in a
BOM to represent
the conceptual
design.

SelfChecking
Peer Review
DecisionMaking
FM.11.2

Alternate items
should be
specified in the
next design phase

Engineer did
not perform
sufficient
research on
items
available in
the market

Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions
SelfChecking

Always research
possible vendors
when choosing
items to ensure
the part or
material is
available in the
market.

DecisionMaking
FM.11.3

Changes in design
during future
phases

Customer and
engineer have
different
views and/or
opinions on
the design

Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions

Discussions with
customer SMEs
throughout the
development of
the design could
help with the
selection of
materials.

Table 38. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Bill of Materials
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Function/
Process
Bill of
Materials

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

FM.11.1

1

2

3

6

FM.11.2

2

2

3

12

FM.11.3

4

2

3

24

Table 39. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Bill of Materials
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Figure 33. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Bill of Materials

131
4.3.16. FMEA for 50.59/72.48 Review
As described in Section 4.2.14, a 50.59/72.48 review is an evaluation of a plant’s
licensing documentation. Therefore, errors in this review can lead to regulatory issues. For a
design project, issues with the 50.59/72.48 review can lead to problems in future design phases.
During the development of a conceptual design this review is preliminary; therefore, changes are
expected to occur during later phases. Two failure modes were identified for this activity. These
are:


FM.12.1 – Originators are not qualified to perform 50.59/72.48 review;



FM.12.2 – Review was not performed correctly.

Table 40 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure
modes identified are shown in Table 41 and Figure 34. The FMEA table shows both failure
modes as having the same impact on the project.
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects
of Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

50.59/72.48
Review

FM.12.1

50.59/72.48
review might not
fulfil customer’s
requirements

Qualified
resources
may not have
been
available to
perform task

Project
Planning

Additional effort
might need to be
added to later
design phases

Individuals
may not have
been familiar
with the
plant’s
process or the
system/comp
onent
evaluated

Validate
Assumptions

FM.12.2

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)

Questioning
Attitude

SelfChecking

Recommended
Action(s)

Always ensure that
assigned
individuals are
qualified under the
process they are
working on.
Individuals should
ensure they are
knowledgeable on
a topic before
accepting to
perform work.

Peer Review

Table 40. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – 50.59/72.48 Review

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

50.59/72.48
Review

FM.12.1

6

2

3

36

FM.12.2

6

2

3

36

Table 41. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – 50.59/72.48 Review
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Figure 34. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – 50.59/72.48 Review
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4.3.17. FMEA for SAR Update
The update of a plant’s Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is a result of the 50.59/72.48
review. The severity of not updating the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) correctly, after the final
design is complete, can result in licensing issues for the plant. Since the changes identified
during the conceptual design review are preliminary, the severity during this phase is not as
significant. Only one failure mode was identified for this activity:


FM.13.1 – Not all affected sections and/or figures were identified.

Table 42 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure
modes identified are shown in Table 43 and Figure 35.

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects
of Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

SAR Update

FM.13.1

Information may
be left out of
SAR, or SAR may
contain outdated
information.

A proper
review of the
SAR may not
have been
performed.

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent and
Detect)
Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions
Peer Review

Recommended
Action(s)

When unsure,
always consult the
Licensing
Department. During
stakeholder
reviews, ensure the
Licensing
stakeholder
provides comments
or
recommendations
for improvement.

Table 42. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – SAR Update

135

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

SAR Update

FM.13.1

4

2

3

24

Table 43. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – SAR Update
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Figure 35. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – SAR Update
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4.3.18. FMEA for Programs Impact Review
The programs impact review performed during the conceptual design phase of a project is
preliminary, but this does not mean that issues with this review are insignificant. The programs
impact review typically evaluates a program and also identifies any documents that would need
to be updated as a result of the implementation of the new design. An example of this is the Fire
Protection Program. As part of this program’s review engineers need to identify if the amounts of
flammable sources in a specific room would be affected. Typically this information is captured
in a calculation, which at the same time determines the design of the fire protection system
within the specific room. If the preliminary review of this program fails to identify the impact of
the new design, this could result in significant rework during future design phases. This rework
could cause changes in schedule and even deliverables. Two failure modes were identified for
this activity. These are:


FM.14.1 – Not all impacted programs are identified ;



FM.14.2 – Impacted programs are not properly evaluated.

Table 44 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure
modes identified are shown in Table 45 and Figure 36. The FMEA table shows both failure
modes as having the same impact on the project.
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Function/
Process
Programs
Impact
Review

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects
of Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

INPO HU
Tools (Prevent
and Detect)

Recommended
Action(s)

FM.14.1

Impacted
programs will
need to be
identified during
later design phases

Engineers
are not
familiar with
the plant’s
programs
and how
they relate to
the project’s
scope

Self-Checking

Ensure engineers
and SME reviewers
are familiar with
the scope of the
project and the
potential impacted
plant programs.
Discussions with
plant program
owners may be
beneficial.

Additional
impacted
documents and
calculations might
be identified and
added to the
project’s scope
FM.14.2

Additional
impacted
documents and
calculations might
be identified and
added to the
project’s scope

Engineers
are not
familiar with
the plant’s
programs
and how
they relate to
the project’s
scope

Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions
Peer Review

Self-Checking
Questioning
Attitude
Validate
Assumptions
Peer Review

Ensure engineers
and SME reviewers
are familiar with
the scope of the
project and the
potential impacted
plant programs.
Discussions with
plant program
owners may be
beneficial.

Table 44. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Programs Impact Review

Function/
Process
Programs
Impact
Review

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

FM.14.1

7

2

3

42

FM.14.2

7

2

3

42

Table 45. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Programs Impact Review

138
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Severity (S)

Occurrence (L)
FM.14.1

Detection (D)

FM.14.2

Figure 36. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Programs Impact Review
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4.3.19. FMEA for SME Internal Review
The SME internal review is the last control to detect issues with a design package. This
analysis identified two failure modes for this activity. These are:


FM.15.1 – SME is not qualified to perform the review;



FM.15.2 – Review identified issues with the content of the package.

Table 46 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. SMEs perform this activity.
The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in
Table 47 and Figure 37. The FMEA table shows FM.15.2, review identified major issues with
the content of the package, as being the most significant issue that could affect this activity.

Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

SME Internal
Review

FM.15.1

Design package
might not fulfil
customer’s
requirements

Qualified
resources
may not
have been
available to
perform the
task

Project
Planning

Always ensure
assigned
individuals are
qualified under the
process they are
working on.

FM.15.2

Design package
might not be ready
to be submitted to
the customer

Resource
engineers
might not
have been
the correct
individuals
to perform
the work

Questioning
Attitude

Enough time
should be allotted
to SME reviews to
allow for a
thorough and high
quality review of
design packages.

Potential Effects
of Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

Peer reviews
failed to
identify
errors

INPO HU
Tools (Prevent
and Detect)

Validate
Assumptions
Peer Review

Recommended
Action(s)

Product
Review
Meeting

Table 46. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – SME Internal Review

140
Function/
Process
SME
Internal
Review

Potential
Failure
Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

FM.15.1

4

1

2

8

FM.15.2

6

1

2

12

Table 47. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – SME Internal Review
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Figure 37. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – SME Internal Review
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4.3.20. FMEA for Next Phase Estimate
The creation of an estimate and schedule for future design phases is one of the most
important activities that can be performed during the conceptual design phase, other than the
development of the design itself. This activity will determine the structure of the remainder of
the project. Errors in estimate or schedule could affect the outcome of the entire project. Five
failure modes were identified for this activity. These are:


FM.16.1 – Person-hour estimate is over or underestimated;



FM.16.2 – Scope changes from the customer;



FM.16.3 – Person-hour estimate not accepted by the customer;



FM.16.4 – Schedule not accepted by the customer;



FM.16.5 – Estimate did not consider all activities to be completed.

Table 48 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource
engineers perform this activity. The customer controls some of the failure modes identified.
Because of this, a detection rating of 7 was assigned to these. The severity, occurrence, and
detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in Table 49 and Figure 38. The
FMEA table shows FM.16.2 as being the most significant issue that could affect this activity and
the entire project.
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure
Modes

Potential Effects
of Failure

Potential
Cause(s) of
Failure

Next Phase
Estimate/
Schedule

FM.16.1

Scope of later
design phases was
not correctly
defined

Engineers were
not familiar
with the scope
and/or did not
identify all
affected
documents

SelfChecking

INPO HU
Tools
(Prevent
and Detect)

Peer
Review
Project
Planning

FM.16.2

Significant
changes in design

Changes in the
customer’s
scope or
changes in the
industry

No controls
are in
place.

FM.16.3

Rework or
complete stop of
project

Engineers were
not familiar
with the scope

No controls
are in
place.

FM.16.4

Rework or
complete stop of
project

Proposed
schedule does
not fit
customer’s
implementation
plans

No controls
are in
place.

FM.16.5

Scope of later
design phases was
not correctly
defined

Engineers were
not familiar
with the scope
and/or did not
identify all
affected
documents

Project
Planning
Peer
Review
Product
Review
Meeting

Recommended
Action(s)

Always ensure that
estimates and
schedules are
reviewed by the
project managers
and/or other
leaders.

Ensure the design
team is constantly
communicating
with the customer
to identify issues
early in the project.

Always ensure that
estimates and
schedules are
reviewed by the
project managers
and/or other
leaders.

Table 48. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – Next Phase
Estimate/Schedule
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Function/
Process

Potential
Failure Modes

Severity
(S)

Occurrence
Rating (L)

Detection
Rating
(D)

RPN
(LxSxD)

Next Phase
Estimate/
Schedule

FM.16.1

4

2

3

24

FM.16.2

9

2

7

126

FM.16.3

4

2

7

56

FM.16.4

4

2

7

56

FM.16.5

5

2

3

30

Table 49. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Next Phase Estimate/Schedule
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Figure 38. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Next Phase Estimate/Schedule
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4.3.21. FMEA Conceptual Design Meeting
No FMEA was performed for this activity. The purpose of this meeting is to present the
developed conceptual design to plant stakeholders. No specific activities would be performed by
engineers or SMEs other than providing a presentation.

4.3.23. Risk Priority Number
As described previously, the RPN is a numerical ranking of the risk of each potential
failure mode/cause, made up of the arithmetic product of the three elements: severity of the
effect, the likelihood of occurrence of the cause, and the likelihood of detection of the cause
(Carlson, 2014). Figure 39 shows the RPN calculated for each activity under this FMEA. The
figure shows FM.16.2, "scope changes from the customer," as being the most significant failure
mode for this design project. Changes in scope by the customer are not detectable. Sometimes, if
the changes are based on regulatory initiatives, they could be anticipated to some extent. A
change in scope after a conceptual design has been developed can have a significant impact on
project cost, schedule, implementation, and even on outage schedule.
The purpose of comparing the RPN of each activity is to create a sense of significance
among all the failure modes identified. Other than identifying FM.16.2 as the most significant,
the RPN graph can give the project team a tool that can be used to prioritize mitigation strategies
for each failure mode. This graph is a representation of INPOs Principle for Excellence in
Integrated Risk Management #5.
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Figure 39. Failure Modes Severity, Occurrence, Detection Ranks, and Risk Priority Number
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The introduction to this dissertation presented the background of engineering design
modification projects in the U.S. nuclear power industry, along with this dissertation’s problem
statement. Various questions were formulated as part of the research, which is addressed as a
case study focused on a hypothetical scope. Topics related to the development of engineering
design modification projects were discussed as part of the literature review, followed by the
research methodology. The results of the research were divided into three parts and comprised
the core of this case study. Part one (i.e., Section 4.1) developed a work breakdown structure
(WBS) for a design modification project. Part two (i.e., Section 4.2) provided descriptions for
activities to be completed as part of a conceptual design package, estimated person-hours, and
proposed duration for each activity. Part three (i.e., Section 4.3) comprised a risk analysis using
the Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) tool. This section summarizes the conclusions from this
case study. The limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and contribution
to the Engineering Management field of knowledge are also addressed.

5.1. Conclusions and Recommendations
This dissertation formulated three fundamental research questions to be addressed as part
of the case study presented here:


Research Question #1 – How does a comprehensive work breakdown structure for
an engineering design project within the nuclear industry look like?



Research Question #2 – What should take place to deliver a successful project?
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Research Question #3 – What kind of risk could I face? What risk response can be
identified? How can these risks impact the overall success of the project?

Research question #1 was answered in Part I of the research results. In this section, a
WBS for a design modification project was presented. Representations of the WBS were
presented in Figure 13 thru Figure 18. These diagrams help the reader visualize the process. The
activities listed in the WBS ranged from the definition of the project scope up to close-out of the
design package. The WBS revealed that the activities involved in this type of nuclear project
could be widespread with some of the activities, such as the 50.59/72.48 review, being unique to
the nuclear industry. These activities are considered part of a detailed design project under the
SDP. Various activities were identified within the WBS as being needed to develop a conceptual
design. The identified activities are discussed in section 4.2 of the dissertation, which leads to the
answer to research question #2.
The discussion presented in Part II answered research question #2. This section provided
steps recommended to perform each of the activities successfully. Even though the processes
discussed should be captured in plant procedures, the descriptions provided in Section 4.2 also
include insights from SME experience, which are typically not recorded in plant procedures.
NEI’s SDP was referenced throughout the section. Each activity discussed was assigned personhour estimates and durations. These estimates were developed in response to the pre-determined
scope of the case study. The results from Part I were captured in Table 14. This table includes the
person-hours assigned to each activity under the responsible resource. This analysis resulted in a
total of 679 hours needed to complete the technical portion of a conceptual design package. The
information presented in this table was then incorporated into the Microsoft Project software.
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The resulting Gantt chart is shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. The activities described in this
section are evaluated for risk in Part III.
Research question #3 was answered in Part III of the research results. This section
evaluated each of the activities described in Part II using the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) tool. The process consisted of identifying failure modes for each activity. Each failure
mode was then evaluated to determine the potential effects and causes of the failure. INPO
human performance tools were assigned to each failure mode. These tools can be used to prevent
or detect the failures. Recommended actions to address or mitigate the failure were also
provided. The results of each activity-specific FMEA were captured in separate tables. Finally,
each failure mode was assigned a severity, occurrence, and detection rating. The criteria for each
scale were described in Table 15, Table 16, and Table 17. These ranks were used to calculate the
risk priority number (RPN). The results from the scale assignment were also captured in separate
tables. A chart was included to provide a graphical representation of the results. Among all the
activities described, a total of 37 failure modes were identified and evaluated. The results of the
overall FMEA were recorded in Figure 39. This chart gives a graphical representation of the
risks that can be expected for each failure mode. Failure mode FM.16.2, “scope changes from the
customer,” corresponding to the “Next Phase Estimate” activity, had the highest priority number.
This result is mainly due to its high severity and detection ranking. The presence of this failure
could cause a significant amount of rework or even the termination of the project. Therefore,
engineers and project managers should pay close attention when performing estimates for later
design phases.
The activities described and evaluated under this case study are assumed to be performed
under a plant-specific quality assurance (QA) program, such as ASME’s NQA-1 (i.e., American
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Society of Mechanical Engineers’ Nuclear Quality Certification). This QA program governs the
procedures under which the work is being performed. Some of these plant-specific procedures
address risks such as the ones identified in Section 4.3 but are typically intended for work
performed for safety-related structures, systems, and components. This dissertation narrows the
gap between risk analysis for safety-related and non-nuclear safety-related work. The results
presented in this paper are expected to assist the U.S. nuclear industry in the identification and
mitigation of risks beyond what is already addressed in plant-specific procedures.
The results from this dissertation shall be applied to the development of an engineering
design modification project iteratively. The recommended actions from the FMEA shall be used
to adjust activities in the WBS. These actions can also be used to improve estimated person-hour
and durations for each activity, assign more resources, and change the scope of reviews. Overall,
this case study can support engineers and projects managers in the development of successful
projects as a supplement to plant-specific processes and procedures.

5.2. Limitations and Future Research
The results of this case study are built upon a hypothetical scope for a U.S. nuclear power
plant. The person-hour estimates and activity durations provided are limited to a conceptual
design performed under the Standard Design Process (SDP). The literature review presented in
this dissertation discussed the subject of multi-unit risk. A risk analysis was not performed to
address this topic since the case study focuses on a design modification to be implemented at a
single-unit nuclear power plant.
The SDP addresses multi-unit matters through the development of a common design
package, listed in Figure 19. The common design process initiates after a conceptual design is
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developed that contains nuclear fleet-level designs and evaluations that are applicable to more
than one nuclear site (SDPSC, 2017). The development of an additional risk assessment, along
with a risk mitigation plan, is a step in the common design process. The risk assessment to
address multi-unit risk could be the basis for future research and could further expand the
Engineering Management field of knowledge.

5.3. Contribution to the Engineering Management Field of Knowledge
The nuclear energy industry is a unique business that relies on the knowledge and
experience of individuals. Although nuclear power plants utilize countless procedures to perform
day-to-day activities, the procedures themselves do not capture essential processes set forth from
experience. With an aging workforce and a large percentage of the nuclear workforce
approaching retirement, it is up to the new generation to gain this knowledge to move the
industry forward. One of the ways this can be achieved is by implementing design modifications.
Design modifications are engineering projects that involve technical problem solving
along with the management of engineering processes. The development of a case study that
describes in detail the process of developing engineering projects for nuclear power plants is a
step towards the documentation of the knowledge needed to successfully develop a design
modification.
Old Dominion University (ODU) defines Engineering Management as a specialized form
of management that is concerned with the application of engineering principles to business
practice (2017). It also states that the discipline addresses the problems, design, and management
of projects and complex operations (ODU, 2017). This definition accurately describes the
foundation of this research as it applies to engineering projects in the nuclear industry. Therefore,
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this research will contribute to the Engineering Management field of knowledge by providing a
source of detailed information that can be used as a guide when developing engineering projects
for nuclear power plants.
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APPENDIX A
The following table is a list of all nuclear power reactors licensed in the U.S. Each
plant/unit is identified by type, PWR or BRW. Status of License Renewal application is also
shown.
#

Plant Name and Unit

PWR

BWR

1

Arkansas Nuclear 1

×

Complete

2

Arkansas Nuclear 2

×

Complete

3

Beaver Valley 1

×

Complete

4

Beaver Valley 2

×

Complete

5

Braidwood 1

×

Complete

6

Braidwood 2

×

Complete

7

Browns Ferry 1

×

Complete

8

Browns Ferry 2

×

Complete

9

Browns Ferry 3

×

Complete

10

Brunswick 1

×

Complete

11

Brunswick 2

×

Complete

12

Byron 1

×

Complete

13

Byron 2

×

Complete

14

Callaway

×

Complete

15

Calvert Cliffs 1

×

Complete

16

Calvert Cliffs 2

×

Complete

17

Catawba 1

×

Complete

18

Catawba 2

×

Complete

19

Clinton

×

To be submitted in 2017

20

Columbia Generating Station

×

Complete

21

Comanche Peak 1

×

To be submitted in 2022

22

Comanche Peak 2

×

To be submitted in 2022

23

Cooper

24

D.C. Cook 1

×
×

License Renewal Application
Status

Complete
Complete

Table 50. List of Power Reactors in the U.S. and Application Status (NRC, 2018)
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#

Plant Name and Unit

PWR

BWR

25

D.C. Cook 2

×

Complete

26

Davis-Besse

×

Complete

27

Diablo Canyon 1

×

Under Review

28

Diablo Canyon 2

×

Under Review

29

Dresden 2

×

Complete

30

Dresden 3

×

Complete

31

Duane Arnold

×

Complete

32

Farley 1

×

Complete

33

Farley 2

×

Complete

34

Fermi 2

×

Complete

35

FitzPatrick

×

Complete

36

Ginna

37

Grand Gulf 1

×

Complete

38

Hatch 1

×

Complete

39

Hatch 2

×

Complete

40

Hope Creek 1

×

Complete

41

Indian Point 2

×

Under Review

42

Indian Point 3

×

Under Review

43

La Salle 1

×

Complete

44

La Salle 2

×

Complete

45

Limerick 1

×

Complete

46

Limerick 2

×

Complete

47

McGuire 1

×

Complete

48

McGuire 2

×

Complete

49

Millstone 2

×

Complete

×

License Renewal Application
Status

Complete

Table 50. Continued
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#

Plant Name and Unit

PWR

BWR

50

Millstone 3

51

Monticello

×

Complete

52

Nine Mile Point 1

×

Complete

53

Nine Mile Point 2

×

Complete

54

North Anna 1

×

Complete

55

North Anna 2

×

Complete

56

Oconee 1

×

Complete

57

Oconee 2

×

Complete

58

Oconee 3

×

Complete

59

Oyster Creek

60

Palisades

×

Complete

61

Palo Verde 1

×

Complete

62

Palo Verde 2

×

Complete

63

Palo Verde 3

×

Complete

64

Peach Bottom 2

×

Complete

65

Peach Bottom 3

×

Complete

66

Perry 1

×

To be submitted in 2019

67

Pilgrim 1

×

Complete

68

Point Beach 1

×

Complete

69

Point Beach 2

×

Complete

70

Prairie Island 1

×

Complete

71

Prairie Island 2

×

Complete

72

Quad Cities 1

×

Complete

73

Quad Cities 2

×

Complete

74

River Bend 1

×

To be submitted in 2017

×

License Renewal Application
Status
Complete

×

Table 50. Continued

Complete
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#

Plant Name and Unit

PWR

BWR

75

Robinson 2

×

Complete

76

Saint Lucie 1

×

Complete

77

Saint Lucie 2

×

Complete

78

Salem 1

×

Complete

79

Salem 2

×

Complete

80

Seabrook 1

×

Under Review

81

Sequoyah 1

×

Complete

82

Sequoyah 2

×

Complete

83

Shearon Harris 1

×

Complete

84

South Texas 1

×

Under Review

85

South Texas 2

×

Under Review

86

Summer

×

Complete

87

Surry 1

×

Complete

88

Surry 2

×

Complete

89

Susquehanna 1

×

Complete

90

Susquehanna 2

×

Complete

91

Three Mile Island 1

×

Complete

92

Turkey Point 3

×

Complete

93

Turkey Point 4

×

Complete

94

Vogtle 1

×

Complete

95

Vogtle 2

×

Complete

96

Waterford 3

×

Under Review

97

Watts Bar 1

×

No intent yet; expires 2035

98

Watts Bar 2

×

No intent yet; expires 2055

99

Wolf Creek 1

×

Complete

Table 50. Continued

License Renewal Application
Status
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Reactor Type

Number of Reactor Units

PWR

66

BWR

34

Table 51. Summary of Reactors in the U.S.

License Renewal Application Status

Number of Reactor Units

Completed

84

Under Review

8

Future Submittal

5

No Intent to Submit Yet

2

Table 52. Summary of License Renewal Application Status for Reactors in the U.S.
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APPENDIX B
Part I Subject Matter Expert (SME) Review
SME: #1
SME Title: Project Engineer Electrical/I&C
Description of SME Experience:
35+ Years of Engineering and Engineering Management experience on power plant projects,
including nuclear and non-nuclear projects.
Scope: Review Part I of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
Chapter 4, Lead-in
paragraph

4.1

1.1.3

Comment/Recommendation
Providing recommended personhour estimates may be difficult
unless you have SME's from all
disciplines and your input is not
all from WEC. If your input was
solely based on information from
WEC sources, I can foresee some
WEC legal type not being too
thrilled. (i.e., they may consider
it to be proprietary)
Should you clarify that the list is
the WBS for Engineering only?
The other groups will also have
WBS's which you have only
partially touched on.
Maybe add Architectural,
Geotechnical. Should you be
adding other department scopes,
such as QA, Procurement,
Construction,
Startup/Commissioning,
Customers/Owner's Scope.
Understanding these groups
scopes (ie, the DOR between
these groups and Engineering)
will help define deliverables and
associated WBS needs.

Resolution
The recommended person-hour
estimates are based on own
experience from current and
previous positions.

Added “from the Engineering
perspective”.

These disciplines follow the SDP,
identified in IP-ENG-001,
Attachment 10.

Table 53. Part I SME #1 Comments and Resolutions
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Section/Table/Figure
1.1.4

1.1

1.1.5

Comment/Recommendation
Maybe indicate "Proposed
Design Change/Problem
Resolution"
Also, I think this should be listed
ahead of the Project Scope.
Unless, this is meant to be the
"Detailed Project Scope".
Suggest adding a section on
defining resources needed versus
resources available. Performing
skills gap analysis and making
decisions to self-perform
engineering or sub-contracting
out the work to third parties who
already possess the necessary
skills. By defining what will be
self-performed and what will be
sub-contracted will in turn define
what activates to include in the
WBS.
Suggest listing the different types
of design input: Existing plant
licensing and design information;
New Design Functional and
Performance Criteria; Regulatory
Requirements; Design Codes and
Standards; Customer/Owner's
operations and maintenance
criteria; Commissioning and
Testing features to be
incorporated into the design;
physical layout and spatial
criteria; engineering discipline
department standards and
guidelines; Owner preferred
supplier information,. You
could expand the list further.
If you want to, you could further
identify design inputs associated
with every program the
Customer/Owner has. (e.g, Fire
protection, MOVs, EQ, Seismic,
etc)
Table 53. Continued

Resolution
Changed to “Proposed Design
Change/Problem Resolution.”

Added new 1.1.3 for identifying
resources needed.

This is explained in Section 4.2
and references the programs
identified in the SPD.
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Section/Table/Figure

1.2.1

1.2.4

1.2.1.2, 1.2.2.2, etc
(Numbering needs to
be reviewed/corrected;
these numbers should
be 1.2.4.2, 1.2.5.2, etc)
1.2.8.1 (Same
comment for
numbering as above)

1.3.2.1

Comment/Recommendation
The exercise of defining all of
the design inputs helps define the
design outputs needed for the
Project.
This is item 1.1.5. Do you need
to repeat here?

General comment: It will be
difficult to provide meaningful
engineering rates without
identifying the specific
documents that each discipline
works with.
Is this meant to include all
reviews, including customer
reviews?

Resolution

The purpose of the repeat is to
ensure that the responsible
engineer is constantly
communicating with the
customer’s design engineering
group.
Those details are shown in section
4.2 where a specific scope of work
is provided, including documents
to be created or updated.

Yes, but mainly aimed at
reviews/verifications performed
by the firm, which will be
estimated in Section 4.2 for a
General question applicable to all specific work scope.
documents listed.
Numbering has been updated.
See comment against 1.6.1
Do you want to list some of these Added data sheets, components
other documents: Equipment
lists, and supplier documents as
Data Sheets, Motor Data Sheets, examples under 1.2.11, other
Instrument Data Sheets.
documents.
equipment lists, electrical load
lists, instrument lists, cable and
raceway lists, cable connection
lists, pipe and valve lists, pipe
hangar lists, EQ equipment lists;
Equipment supplier documents,
engineering service supplier
documents; BOMs.
The above could be condensed in
generic categories of Data
Sheets, Component Lists,
Supplier Documents, BOMs.
Suggest adding (ie,
constructability review)
Table 53. Continued

Added.
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Section/Table/Figure
1.3.3.3

1.3.4.1

1.6.1

1.6.1
2
1.2

Comment/Recommendation
Coordinate with Owner as well.
Or, is this this just part of the
BOM review/approve cycle in
1.2.8.2?
Maybe indicate both Owner's
testing group as well as whoever
is contracted to perform the
testing?
You have these reviews listed
here, but also include them in
Section 1.2. Seems redundant.

Resolution
Updated 1.3.3.1 to “obtain input
from customer (e.g. procurement,
engineering, installing group).”
Updated to “Obtain Input from
Customer (e.g. test group).”
The reviews listed under 1.2 are
for processes outside of the design
package. The reviews listed under
1.6.1 are for the design package.
Updated 1.6.1 to “Design Package
Inter-Discipline
Review/Verification.”
See previous response.

Suggest adding "Inter-discipline
Reviews."
Suggest adding: "Performance
Added as 2.3.
test acceptance report reviews."
It might be better to list all the
See response for 1.6.1.
documents in one section, then
list the sequencing of review and
processing that is typical for each
document. When done this way,
you can expand upon the list of
reviewer/verifiers instead of in
1.6.1
Table 53. Continued
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SME: #2
SME Title: Structural Engineer
Description of SME Experience:
Structural engineer of plant mods at nuclear power plants.
Scope: Review Part I of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
4.1 / 1.2.1

1.2.5.1

1.2.4 thru 1.2.11
1.3.2.1

1.4.2.1
1.4.4.1
1.6.1.2

1.6.4

2.2
2.3

Comment/Recommendation
This seems to be from the
perspective of an outside
contractor. Recommend reword
to 5 guys meeting or equivalent
Recommend “station” procedures
to differentiate between
installation procedures
Numbering doesn’t match higher
tier
The engineer writes the
instructions, may need to add
some language, sounds like the
installer is doing this. The
installer reviews the package, but
doesn’t write the instructions.
Similar for 1.3.3 and 1.3.4
Typically only updates to the
SAR are provided, the station
updates the sar all at one time
Update if required, not always
required

Resolution
Added “Customer’s” to specify.

Changed 1.2.8.1 (updated number)
to “Update/Generate
Administrative and Installation
Procedures”
Updated numbering.
Changed to “Obtain Input
from…” on 1.3.2.1, 1.3.3.1, and
1.3.4.1.

Changed to “Identify
Recommended Changes to the
SAR.”
Changed to “Identify
Recommended Changes to the
Operating License.”
The case study is based on an
outside firm doing the work.

Written from an outside firm’s
perspective, may want to keep it
to a station’s wbs. An outside
firm would be working to an
augmented program.
Should you add “and get final
Added 1.6.5, “Final signatures and
signatures”? The activities make approval.”
sense, but may want to show that
these are part of the design phase
before the package is approved.
Add “minor” changes
Added.
Return “SSC” to service
Added “SSC.”
Table 54. Part I SME #2 Comments and Resolutions
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SME: #3
SME Title: Project Manager
Description of SME Experience:
Project manager for nuclear plant design modifications with more than 15 years of technical
engineering experience.
Scope: Review Part I of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
Introduction and
Literature Review
WBS 1.4
WBS 1.4.2
WBS 1.6.1.1

Comment/Recommendation
Editorial comments throughout.
Markup provided.
Do you have to define this or
have it more generalized?
Define SAR.
Define SME.

Updated.

Resolution

Updated.
Defined.
Defined.

Table 55. Part I SME #3 Comments and Resolutions
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APPENDIX C
Part II Subject Matter Expert (SME) Review
SME: #1
SME Title: Project Engineer Electrical/I&C
Description of SME Experience:
35+ years in engineering, engineering supervision, engineering project management for fossil
and nuclear power plant projects.
Scope: Review Part II of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
Project Definition and
Pre-Design Walkdown

Project Definition and
Pre-Design Walkdown

Project Definition and
Pre-Design Walkdown
Project Definition and
Pre-Design Walkdown

Comment/Recommendation
This is especially true for nonsafety related designs as the
plant's configuration control
tends to put more focus on the
safety-related design.
"Craft" is normally associated
with construction personnel.
Unless "craft" is a generic term
in your writings, suggest that you
indicate "plant operations and
maintenance personnel". "Craft"
could be still considered a
stakeholder since they are the
customer to engineering's
construction design and may
have some insight as to
constructability issues.
Do you want to be using a
command tense 'shall', instead of
a recommendation tense, i.e.,
'should' (typical comment)?
Suggest adding: For purposes of
this simplified case, It will be
assumed that there are no
electrical controls and no heat
tracing required."

Resolution
Agree. Added some explanation.

Replaced “craft” with “plant
operations and maintenance”.

Replaced “shall” with “should” in
most instances.
Added.

Table 56. Part II SME #1 Comments and Resolutions
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Section/Table/Figure
Project Definition and
Pre-Design Walkdown

Design Inputs

Design Inputs
Design Inputs

Comment/Recommendation
Suggest adding: "For simplicity,
engineering supervision, project
management, and other overhead
charges will be ignored when
developing the estimate. These
charges are typically percentages
of the direct engineering cost."
Does the SDP address schedule?
This is what puts the demand on
the resources. For example, a
modification needing to be
incorporated in a future outage
will be less demanding than one
that needs to be incorporated in
the upcoming outage.
Are you adding more here? or
should this be "...etc.)"
Goal of the Conceptual phase
should be to take the design from
a rough idea to one that has
structure and legitimacy. All
items potentially having a high
risk impact on cost or
acceptability should be
identified, defined, and
incorporated into the conceptual
design. Other risks can be
cataloged in a risk register with
mitigating strategies.
Also, the type of documents
created during the conceptual
phase should be agreed to with
the customer. Different
customers have different
expectations.
You could add this to Page 61
discussion where you introduce
the conceptual design phase.
Table 56. Continued

Added.

Resolution

The SDP des not specifically
discuss this subject.

No. This bullet continues on the
next one below.
Added wording.
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Section/Table/Figure
Drawings

Drawings
Drawings

Comment/Recommendation
Suggest putting this first as all
design flows down from key
documents.
Also, note that in many
organizations, the Mechanical
Engineers are not the people
doing the piping layout. ME's
know the mechanical system
process information, selection of
pipe class, and determination of
the sizing. Separate personnel
typically do the piping routing,
design of pipe supports, and
perform the stress analysis.
These can be other ME's or
Piping designers. C/S Engineers
usually only get involved when
there is a special attachment to a
structure needed, or when a
foundation is needed.
'Design technician' may be more
PC.
Double edge sword. Designers
are typically paid less per hour
than engineers, particularly
Principal engineers. Unless PE
has good working cad skills, the
task should be left to a design
technician.
What you generally find is the
most senior engineers do not
have these skills. I do agree that
it should be the company's goal
that the young engineers acquire
these skills as early in their
careers as possible for the
reasons you state.
Table 56. Continued

Resolution
Moved item.

Changed “drafter” to “design
technician”.
Agree.
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Section/Table/Figure
Drawings

Calculations
Specifications

Procedures

Installation
Instructions

Comment/Recommendation
And in what format? We have
people who know only
Microstation and don't know
Autocad, and vice-a-versa. This
plays into the required skills of
the resources and the job-hour
estimates.
Change “future” to “later”
Some amount of time is needed
to specify the valve either on a
BOM or on a procurement
requisition.
This detail is likely not important
with regards to what you are
trying to present, but I felt I
should mention.
I note that the procedures here
are the plant operating
procedures rather than the design
change package and supporting
document procedures. Maybe
clarify?
YES! I agree 100%. Not
recognizing how the design will
be tested or commissioned is a
major source of under-estimates.
Key stakeholders in the
conceptual design phase are the
construction and commissioning
managers.
Table 56. Continued

Added.

Resolution

Updated.
This information accounted for in
the “Bill of materials” section.

Updated to “Plant Operating
Procedures”.

Agree.
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SME: #2
SME Title: Structural Engineer
Description of SME Experience:
15 years of structural design of nuclear facilities
Scope: Review Part II of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
4.2
Page 61, before bullets

Page 62

Page 62, last
paragraph before PreJob Brief
Page 63
Page 63
Page 64
Page 64
Page 66
Page 66

Comment/Recommendation
2 paragraph, change “divided in
phases” to “divided into phases”
You’re jumping right into a
project, but it would be helpful to
explain the scoping that was
already performed. For example,
why are they installing the drain
line?
A more realistic resource
allocation would be something
less than 100% utilization,
possibly 7 hours/day
Change “As stated in previously”
to “As stated previously”

Resolution
Updated to “into”.

Typo “led” to “lead”
Note that procedures are not
controlled once printed
Wouldn’t the scope start in the
PJB? Then be expanded or
confirmed during the walkdown
Change “contains accurate
information” to contains accurate
or complete information”
Change ” that under
consideration” to “that into
consideration”
Delete “Same applies to any
other disciplines”, as this is
obvious

This is the past tense for lead.
Agree.

nd

Added background information.

Changed to 7 hours/day.

Updated.

Added “Pre-job briefs are also an
essential activity to perform
before walkdowns”.
Updated.
Updated.
Deleted.

Table 57. Part II SME #2 Comments and Resolutions

173
Section/Table/Figure
Page 70 – cad
paragraph
Page 72
Page 73 - TR

Page 74

Comment/Recommendation
I don’t agree with using
engineers to do drafting; doesn’t
seem like an efficient use of
resources. No change required.
Doesn’t the pipe support need a
calculation?
Change “only add a drain line to
FWT” to “only adds a drain line
to FWT”
Change “assumed that not” to
“assumed that no”
“radioactive area” should be
“radiation controlled area”
Table 57. Continued

Resolution
Somewhat agree.

Added calculation for pipe
support, including person-hour
estimate.
Updated.

Updated.
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SME: #3
SME Title: Project Manager
Description of SME Experience:
Project manager for nuclear plant design modifications with more than 15 years of technical
engineering experience.
Scope: Review Part II of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
Section 4.2

Comment/Recommendation
Editorial comments. Markup
provided.

Updated.

Resolution

Table 58. Part II SME #3 Comments and Resolutions

175
APPENDIX D
Part III Subject Matter Expert (SME) Review
SME: #1
SME Title: Project Engineer Electrical/I&C
Description of SME Experience:
35+ years in engineering, engineering supervision, engineering project management for fossil
and nuclear power plant projects.
Scope: Review Part III of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on
how to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
All
4.3.5
4.3.22

Comment/Recommendation
Editorial comments throughout.
Need to identify “FM 1.1” in the
writeup. “FM 1.2” is identified,
but not FM 1.1
You might want to contrast your
conclusions to the QA program
and procedures the work is being
done under. I think you will find
that many of the risks are already
addressed by the program and
procedures if the design is safety
related, but less so for non-safety
related work. This gap analysis
will help focus on what else
should be done to mitigate risk
beyond what the current program
already addresses.
Following on from previous
comment, do you have any
suggestions for the reader on
how to deal with the identified
risks for this sample project?
Should you inflate the budget?
Adjust schedule? Get different
resources?

Resolution

Updated.
This has been added as part of
Chapter 5, under conclusions.
This has been added as part of
Chapter 5, under
recommendations.

Updated.

Table 59. Part III SME #1 Comments and Resolutions
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SME: #2
SME Title: Structural Engineer
Description of SME Experience:
Structural engineer of plant mods at nuclear power plants.
Scope: Review Part III of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on
how to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
4.3.2
4.3.2 last sentence
4.3.3
4.3.9 2nd sentence
Figure 4.3-5
Table 4.3-8
4.3.12

Figure 4.3-11
4.3.20 2nd sentence
4.3.20

Comment/Recommendation
“engineers experience” to
“experience and capability of the
resource engineers”
Remove “generated”

Updated.

Resolution

Removed.

“engineers experience” to
“experience and capability of the
resource engineers”
Change “sine” to “since”

Updated.

FM.5.2, severity shown as 5 but
listed as 2, RPN calculated based
on S=5
Detection for calculation errors
should be higher, as it is very
difficult to detect errors.
Recommend at least 3.
Occurrence and detection should
be at least 1 notch higher, based
on my experience.
“reminder” to “remainder”
First you say detection is 3, then
detection is 7. I see where the
different FM16’s have 3 and 7 in
the table, it just isn’t clear in the
write up. Maybe need to just
point to the table for a
description.

Updated to 2.

Updated.

Updated to 3.

Occurrence and detection updated
to 2 and 3, respectively.
Updated.
Added explanation.

Table 60. Part III SME #2 Comments and Resolutions
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SME: #3
SME Title: Project Manager
Description of SME Experience:
Project manager for nuclear plant design modifications with more than 15 years of technical
engineering experience.
Scope: Review Part III of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on
how to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects.
Section/Table/Figure
Section 4.3
4.3.17
All 4.3.x

Comment/Recommendation
Editorial comments. Markup
provided.
Define SAR.
Remove sentence “The engineers
in this case study are
experienced…” and “Therefore
an occurrence…” These
sentences are repetitive.

Updated.

Resolution

SAR has been defined.
Removed sentences from
individual section. Added overall
statement to Section 4.3.4.

Table 61. Part III SME #3 Comments and Resolutions
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